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The purpose of this research is to examine whether investors are better served by follow-
ing the recommendations of independent analysts compared to brokerage analysts during 
2010–2018 in the Finnish stock market. This study contributes to the existing literature 
by examining the recommendation performance of purely independent equity research, 
which most past studies have been unable accomplish due to small sample sizes. Further-
more, the performance is compared to traditional brokerage research to examine whether 
the value of equity research differs between independent and brokerage analysts. 
 
The data for this study extends from the year independent research begun in the Finnish 
market from February 2010 through May 2018. The data consists of stock recommenda-
tions for stock listed companies in OMX Helsinki. The final sample consists of 3438 
recommendations issued by 24 research firms. The hypotheses are tested by examining 
the differences in average recommendation levels, announcement period returns, and 
long-term portfolio returns. Univariate analyses utilize two-sample t-test, two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and chi-squared test, whereas multivariate analyses are con-
ducted with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. 
 
The results show that brokerage analysts are relatively more optimistic than independent 
analysts. However, the market initially values the recommendation revisions from both 
analyst types equally. In contrast, independent analysts clearly outperform in the long-
term by generating gross abnormal returns of approximately 10 % annualized, whereas 
brokerage analysts do not generate abnormal returns. The abnormal returns are robust to 
controlling for transaction costs and less frequent portfolio rebalancing. Moreover, the 
outperformance is more pronounced for stocks with greater information asymmetry. In 
addition, signs of the market learning to predict on-going research processes is docu-
mented, however, the tests do not control for other events taking place before the issuance 
of recommendations. 
 
Keywords: independent equity research, analysts, conflict of interest, stock recommen-
dations, abnormal returns 
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Tämän tutkielman tarkoituksena on selvittää, onko sijoittajien hyödyllisempää seurata 
riippumattomien analyytikoiden suosituksia kuin pankkianalyytikoiden vuosina 2010–
2018 Suomen osakemarkkinoilla. Tämä tutkimus edistää aiempaa kirjallisuutta tutkimalla 
riippumattoman osaketutkimuksen suositusmenestystä, jota aiempi kirjallisuus ei ole täy-
sin pystynyt mittaamaan pienten otoskokojen takia. Tämän lisäksi suositusmenestystä 
verrataan perinteisiin pankkitoimijoihin, minkä avulla selvitetään, onko osaketutkimuk-
sen arvossa eroja riippumattomien ja pankkianalyytikoiden välillä. 
 
Tutkimusaineisto on kerätty vuodesta, jolloin riippumaton osaketutkimus alkoi Suomen 
osakemarkkinoilla alkaen helmikuusta 2010 ja päättyen toukokuuhun 2018. Aineisto 
koostuu osakesuosituksista listatuille yhtiöille OMX Helsinki markkinapaikalla. Lopulli-
nen aineisto koostuu 3438 suosituksesta 24 osaketutkimuksen tarjoajalta. Hypoteesien 
testauksessa tutkitaan eroja suositustasoissa, julkaisuperiodin tuotoissa sekä pitkän aika-
välin portfoliotuotoissa. Yhden muuttujan testeissä sovelletaan kahden otoksen t-testiä, 
kahden otoksen Kolmogorov-Smirnov -testiä sekä Khiin neliö -testiä ja monimuuttuja 
analyyseissä pienimmän neliösumman (OLS) regressioanalyysiä. 
 
Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että perinteiset pankkianalyytikot ovat suhteellisesti opti-
mistisempia kuin riippumattomat analyytikot. Markkinat kuitenkin näkevät suositusmuu-
tokset lyhyellä aikavälillä samanarvoisina. Sitä vastoin riippumattomat analyytikot me-
nestyvät merkittävästi paremmin pitkällä aikavälillä tuottaen noin 10 % vuosittaista epä-
normaalia tuottoa, kun taas pankkianalyytikot eivät tuota epänormaaleja tuottoja. Epänor-
maalit tuotot ovat vankkoja ottaen huomioon transaktiokustannukset ja portfolioiden har-
vemman tasapainottamisen. Arvonluonnin osoitetaan myös painottuvan osakkeisiin, 
joilla on suurempi informaation epäsymmetria. Lisäksi tulokset osoittavat viitteitä siitä, 
että markkinat oppivat ennustamaan analyytikoiden tutkimusprosessia, vaikkakin testit 
eivät kontrolloi muiden tapahtumien mahdollista vaikutusta ennen suositusten julkaise-
mista. 
 
Avainsanat: riippumaton osaketutkimus, analyytikot, intressiristiriita, osakesuositukset, 
epänormaalit tuotot 
 
Tämän julkaisun alkuperäisyys on tarkastettu Turnitin OriginalityCheck –ohjelmalla. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Academic research on the capital markets acknowledges information as the main driver 
for changes in asset prices (Fama, 1970). The role of equity research is of interest to 
academics because of analysts’ role as informational intermediaries in the markets. The 
value of equity research stems from the fact that there are costs to searching information 
(Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988). Investors can choose between incurring cognitive and op-
portunity costs of time, if they search information themselves, or monetary costs, if they 
outsource the information discovery to a third party, in this instance to equity analysts 
(Smith, Venkatraman & Dholakia, 1999). Consistent with this, various studies have doc-
umented value in analyst research as measured by the subsequent abnormal returns to 
analyst recommendations or research reports (Elton, Gruber & Grossman, 1986; Stickel, 
1995; Womack, 1996). However, most studies do not account for transaction costs, which 
are found to have a diminishing effect on the abnormal returns (Barber et al., 2001). 
 
The field of equity research became of increasing interest to practitioners and academics 
alike after the stock market bubble of 2000, and even more after the financial crisis of 
2007. Many of the studies on equity research have questioned the impartiality of the re-
search provided to investors when it is apparent that the goals of investors and analysts 
might not be aligned due to conflicts of interest. These conflicts have been acknowledged 
to stem from either investment banking services (Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & 
Womack, 1999) or trading incentives (Hayes, 1998; Irvine, 2004; Jackson, 2005). An 
opposing hypothesis is also discussed: the superior information hypothesis states that 
other relationships with the research subject increase the information available to the an-
alyst, which in turn leads to more accurate research. Various studies in the field have 
addressed this problem, but no clear consensus exists. This is at least partially explained 
by the three different definitions existing for independent research: (1) having no affilia-
tion to the research subject (e.g. Michaely & Womack, 1999; Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 
2008), (2) having no investment banking business (e.g. Barber, Lehavy & Trueman, 2007; 
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Agrawal & Chen, 2008), or (3) having no other business apart from research services, in 
other words, purely independent (e.g. Cowen, Groysberg & Healy, 2007; Casey, 2013).  
 
Although there is an extensive literature concerning equity research and its potential con-
flicts of interest, the area of purely independent research is still a scarcely studied area 
due to the small number of such research firms. Furthermore, recent regulatory changes, 
for example the MiFID II, increase the pressure on research departments to increase their 
independence by further separating the research departments from other parts of the firms. 
Consequently, the research departments need to come up with new business models to 
sustain their services. This change has been criticized by investment professionals (e.g. 
Financial Times, 2018), and said to lead to decreases in the amount and value of equity 
research. These concerns bring up the question whether investors are better served by 
research from purely independent research firms as opposed to traditional brokerage firms 
that are subject to potential conflicts of interest. 
  
This paper extends the existing literature by investigating whether purely independent 
research provides more value to investors compared to traditional brokerage firm re-
search. Furthermore, the effects of potential conflicts of interest in traditional brokerage 
research firms are analyzed and compared to independent research firms. Examination is 
done using data from the Finnish stock market from a recent time period from February 
2010 through May 2018. Unlike some earlier studies that have had problems with having 
too few inputs from purely independent firms, the sample of this research does not share 
this problem, and there is a sufficient amount of independent recommendations to conduct 
reliable analyses and comparisons. 
 
 
1.2 Research objective and questions 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether there is a difference in the value of 
equity research between purely independent and traditional brokerage analysts. The ob-
jective of the research comprises three research questions. The first question considers 
whether there is evidence of conflicts of interest existing for brokerage analysts due to 
the firms’ other relationships with the research subjects. The second question aims to 
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answer whether these potential conflicts of interest affect the value of equity research, as 
measured by the subsequent stock returns to recommendation revisions. To conclude, the 
third question is concerned with whether the characteristics of covered stocks differs be-
tween the analyst types, in other words, if value created by different analyst types stems 
from different type of stocks. Based on the review of prior literature and theory four hy-
potheses are formed. The relationship between the research questions and hypotheses is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. The hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
 
H1: Brokerage analysts issue more optimistic recommendations and target 
prices than independent analysts. 
 
H2: Independent analyst recommendations generate greater returns than 
brokerage analyst recommendations. 
 
H3: Greater information asymmetry between investors and company man-
agement induces greater market reactions to recommendation revisions. 
 
H4: The market learns to predict on-going brokerage research processes to 
a greater extent than independent research processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between research questions and hypotheses  
Does the value of equity research 
differ between independent and 
brokerage analysts?  
H1  H2  H3  H4  
Is there evidence of 
conflicts of interest  
existing? 
Do conflicts of interest 
affect the value of 
equity research?  
Is the value more  
pronounced for certain 
type of stocks? 
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1.3 Methodology and data 
 
The approach to this research is quantitative. The research comprises three sets of tests to 
test the hypotheses. To measure the differences in relative optimism between independent 
analysts and brokerage and investment banks analysts, the average recommendations and 
target prices are compared, and the significance of possible differences is analyzed with 
a two-sample t-test. 
 
Furthermore, to measure the information value of analyst research, two methods are ap-
plied. First, the market reaction around the announcement of a stock recommendations is 
analyzed by utilizing an event study method adopted from Bradley, Jordan and Ritter 
(2003; 2008). These announcement period returns are compared between the two analyst 
groups by utilizing two-sample t-test, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and chi-
squared test. In addition, regression analysis is utilized to control for target firm size, low 
analyst coverage and absolute recommendation levels. 
 
Second, the long-term value of analyst research is analyzed by adopting a portfolio 
method from Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007). Portfolios are constructed by assum-
ing a buy-and-hold investment strategy to analyst recommendations that are divided into 
buy and sell portfolios based on the level of the recommendation. Portfolios are re-
balanced on a daily basis and reiterations of recommendations are excluded from the 
portfolios. Subsequently, daily returns are compounded to monthly returns, and abnormal 
returns are estimated with a regression analysis by using three different risk models: 
CAPM, 3-factor model and 4-factor model. 
 
The research is conducted with a dataset of stock recommendations and target prices from 
the Finnish stock market from February 2010 through May 2018. Daily recommenda-
tions, target prices and stock price data are collected from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S 
database. The data is partly predisposed to a survivorship bias since recommendations for 
companies that an analyst firm has terminated coverage of are absent from the data. Fur-
thermore, some research firms record their inputs anonymously due to which they are 
excluded from the data. The research data contains approximately 60 % of all the recom-
mendations recorded in the database. 
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1.4 Structure of the research 
 
The research is divided into five sections. In the following section the most important 
theories and prior literature around the subject are reviewed. The section starts by de-
scribing the role analysts have in the capital markets as information intermediaries and 
the value their research has for market participants. Then the quality of research is defined 
as the function of analysts’ competence and independence and the most important factors 
documented to affect these are reviewed. Furthermore, the theories behind analyst con-
flicts of interest are presented and studies on independent equity research are reviewed in 
more detail. In addition, the regulatory environment concerning equity analysts is dis-
cussed. To finish, the second section summarizes the observations from prior literature 
and presents the hypotheses for this research. 
 
Section three begins with describing the data sample collected for the analysis. Subse-
quently, the research design is presented along with the descriptions of the relevant mod-
els and statistical methods that are utilized. Moving over to section four, the results of the 
empirical analysis is presented consisting of descriptive statistics and analyses of recom-
mendations, target prices, announcement period returns, and long-term portfolio returns. 
The section ends with a set of robustness checks to further validate the results. 
 
The last section presents the most important findings of the study along with a discussion 
of their meaning and importance. The main contributions of the study are also presented. 
Moreover, the section contains evaluation of the reliability and limitations of the study 
before concluding with a discussion of some of the key themes emerging from the study 
that could be of interest for future research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
2.1 Role of equity research and investment value of analyst disclosures 
 
2.1.1 Analysts role 
 
In the capital markets new information is considered as the main driver for changes in 
asset prices (Fama, 1970). Although it is not clear whether all information is always and 
instantly incorporated into asset prices (see, e.g., Ball, 1978; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980; 
Merton, 1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Barber et al., 2001), new information is still the 
factor on which changes in asset prices are based on. In order for investors to acquire new 
information, they will incur different kind of costs depending on how the information is 
acquired. If investor chooses to search, process and validate information himself, he in-
curs cognitive costs for the efforts he must engage in and also opportunity costs of time 
for the other activities he needs to abandon, whereas if the investor chooses to rely on a 
third party and buys information from them, he incurs monetary costs (Smith, Venkatra-
man & Dholakia, 1999). Consistently, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) identify four infor-
mation-related commodities in the capital markets: newsletters, security analysis, fund 
management and investment advisory services. In the case of equity research services are 
generally provided in the former two categories, especially in security analysis. 
 
One of the objectives of equity research is to mitigate possible information asymmetries 
between company management and investors, which enables efficient allocation of re-
sources, capital market development, increased market liquidity, decreased cost of capi-
tal, lower return volatility and higher analyst forecast accuracy (Kothari, Li & Short, 
2009). Furthermore, analyst coverage helps to increase the recognition of stocks and the 
fundamental performance of companies (Li & Yue, 2015). In other words, analysts con-
tribute to the available information in the markets and thus increase the market’s effi-
ciency (Lo, 2012) and reduce information asymmetry (D’Mello & Ferris, 2000). 
 
Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008) present a model of analysts reporting environment, 
which describes the most important inputs and outputs of analysts work, as well as key 
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factors affecting their work. In the model, analysts collect information from five sources: 
(1) company earnings, (2) other information from SEC filings, (3) industry information, 
(4) macro-economic information, and (5) management communication and other infor-
mation. Analysts then process and interpret the information to produce (1) descriptions 
of company prospects, (2) earnings forecasts, (3) price forecasts, and (4) recommenda-
tions, which combined ultimately lead to publishing a research report. (Ramnath, Rock 
& Shane, 2008.) The model provides insight into analysts’ role in the capital markets, as 
well as to the nature of their work which can be summarized into two steps: (1) search 
and collect information from relevant available sources and (2) analyze, validate and in-
terpret the available information.  
 
Furthermore, Brown et al. (2015) find that when producing their outputs, analysts con-
sider their private communication with company management even more useful than re-
cent public disclosures by the company (see also Soltes, 2014). Even though companies 
are forbidden to disclose any material information in private discussions, communication 
with management provides analysts additional context to interpret publicly released in-
formation (Soltes, 2014). Moreover, the benefit goes both ways as private communication 
with analysts helps the companies itself prepare for public releases, for example, confer-
ence calls (Brown et al., 2018). In addition, analysts work as intermediaries in private 
conversations as they provide private management access to their institutional investor 
clients (Soltes, 2014; Brown et al., 2015). 
 
In addition to working as intermediaries, analysts have an impact on other areas as well. 
Chen, Harford and Lin (2015) show that analysts have a monitoring role in corporate 
governance of companies. They find that less analyst coverage is associated with lower 
shareholder value, higher excess compensation of the CEO, higher probability of value-
destroying acquisitions and higher probability of earnings management activities. Nega-
tive effects are also documented. He and Tian (2013) find that analyst coverage exerts 
pressure on company management to meet short-term targets, which hinders the com-
pany’s performance in long-term innovation projects. In contrast, Guo, Pérez-Castrillo 
and Toldrà-Simats (2018) find that even though analyst pressure leads to decreases in 
internal research and development costs, it also leads to increased amount of venture cap-
ital investments and acquisition of other innovative firms, which in turn lead to more 
breakthrough innovations. In sum, these studies provide evidence of analysts monitoring 
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role and its importance in decreasing agency costs between company management and 
owners. 
 
 
2.1.2 Investment value of analyst coverage 
 
As previously discussed, analysts’ main role as intermediaries is to both provide and in-
terpret information for investors (Schipper, 1991) which means that there are also two 
ways an analyst can provide value to investors: discover new information or interpret 
existing public information. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) find that approximately half 
of analyst reports contain new information to the market. Furthermore, they find that the 
market tends to react to also those reports without new information, which is evidence 
that analysts merely interpreting information from other sources is valuable to investors 
(Asquith, Mikhail & Au, 2005). Moreover, Frankel, Kothari and Weber (2006) find that 
on average analyst reports are informative to the market. They also find that the ability to 
supply new information is a critical factor for an analyst when intending to follow a com-
pany. In essence, analysts become more informative when investors can derive more 
value from their reports.  
 
Some slightly contradictory evidence is presented by Kothari, Li and Short (2009) who 
find that even though the market reacts to analyst reports, a heavy discount is applied, 
suggesting that the market either questions analysts’ credibility or that the information 
provided is not valuable. Furthermore, Li and You (2015) find that analysts mainly create 
value by increasing the recognition of the stock and not by reducing information asym-
metry, although their study is limited to coverage initiations and terminations and does 
not include on-going coverage. Difference of these results could stem from the fact that 
the recognition factor plays an important role when initiating the coverage of a stock, but 
the situation changes for on-going coverage and the information factor takes over.  
 
Analyst reports are largely based on quantifiable measures, such as financial data, and 
hence the most important outputs are usually quantifiable also. Consistent with this As-
quith, Mikhail and Au (2005) document significant market reactions to earnings forecast, 
recommendation and price target revisions, which all provide valuable information inde-
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pendently and in aggregate. However, qualitative components of the reports (analyst ar-
gumentation) are also found to provide valuable information (Asquith, Mikhail & Au, 
2005). Furthermore, negative news is found to be more significant and the market gener-
ally applies a discount on positive news (Asquith, Mikhail & Au, 2005; Kothari, Li & 
Short, 2009). 
 
Earnings forecasts 
As analysts collect and interpret company specific and macroeconomic data, one of their 
most followed outputs is the prediction of future performance of the company, specifi-
cally the future earnings of the company. Earnings forecasts helps the investors to see 
how the business of the company is developing and they are also useful for the most 
common company valuation formulas. The value of analysts’ earnings forecasts has been 
covered in a vast number of studies (Lys & Sohn, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; Stickel, 1995; 
Francis & Soffer, 1997; Izkovic & Jegadeesh, 2004; Ciccone, 2005; Asquith, Mikhail & 
Au, 2005; Clement, Hales & Xue, 2011). 
 
Lys and Sohn (1990) show that earnings forecasts revisions are informative to the market 
despite there being prior forecasts by other analysts, and that the forecasts explain roughly 
two thirds of the stock’s performance prior to the forecast announcement. Furthermore, 
Clement, Hales and Xue (2011) show that the presence of other analyst forecasts allows 
the analyst to extract information from the other forecasts and issue relatively more ac-
curate forecasts himself. Consistent with Lys and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell (1991) docu-
ments that analysts do not fully incorporate prior stock price development in their fore-
casts and discusses two possible explanations: (1) analyst inefficiency in interpreting pub-
licly observable signals or (2) analysts having incentives to provide new forecasts only 
after collecting new private information independent of public price changes. The under-
lying assumption in these explanations is that the prior stock price performance is a reli-
able measure of future earnings, which means that stock prices always incorporate all 
available information. However, contradicting evidence on stock prices incorporating all 
available information has also been documented (see, e.g., Ball, 1978; Grossman & 
Stiglitz, 1980; Merton, 1987; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Barber et al., 2001).  
 
Consistent with prior literature, Izkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) find that analyst earnings 
forecasts are informative, although their findings suggest that the value is greater when 
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the forecasts are based on independently collected information rather than public infor-
mation (e.g. company announcements). Moreover, Ciccone (2005) shows that the in-
formativeness of analyst forecasts has increased over the years, and that greater value is 
provided when forecasting loss firm earnings rather than profit firm, because loss earn-
ings seem to be more difficult to predict. Collectively these findings indicate that analysts 
in general have developed their expertise in forecasting and most value is provided when 
analysts seek for new information, especially on loss firms.  
 
Earnings forecasts are not subordinate to recommendations or target prices nor vice versa 
as they all provide information independently and in aggregate (Asquith, Mikhail & Au, 
2005). In fact, Francis and Soffer (1997) find that when a favorable recommendation is 
issued, investors pay increasingly more attention to earnings forecasts, which strengthen 
the already positive signal from the recommendation (see also Stickel, 1995). This finding 
suggests that investors tread with caution when it comes to favorable stock recommenda-
tions and make use of all the information before making any decisions based on the rec-
ommendation. 
 
Stock recommendations and price targets 
Stock recommendations are a clear signal for investors on which stocks analysts see the 
most potential in. Recommendations convey a clear course of action, whereas earnings 
forecasts and price targets are number estimates, and the interpretation whether they are 
potential or not is up to the user of the information (Elton, Gruber & Grossman, 1986). 
Nevertheless, all are informative and valuable to investors (Asquith, Mikhail & Au, 
2005). Several studies have investigated the value of stock recommendations (Elton, 
Gruber & Grossman, 1986; Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Francis & Soffer, 1997; Barber 
et al., 2001; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Asquith, Mikhail & Au, 2005; Green, 2006; Jegadeesh 
& Kim, 2006; Barber, Lehavy & Trueman, 2010; Baker & Dumont, 2014; Altınkılıç, 
Hansen & Ye, 2016). 
 
Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) are one of the first ones to study the value of analyst 
recommendations. They show that analyst recommendations earn excess returns up to 
three months after the recommendation is issued. Moreover, no differences in the perfor-
mance between different analyst firms is identified. Stickel (1995) finds that analyst rec-
ommendations appear to have permanent informational effects, although the effect is 
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small and other factors also seem to influence the subsequent abnormal returns. In con-
trast to Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986), Stickel (1995) documents differences be-
tween analyst firms: recommendations by All-American analysts and analysts in larger 
firms have greater impact on stock prices, although this effect appears to be only tempo-
rary. Womack (1996) finds strong evidence that analyst recommendations influence stock 
prices and that the effect is not limited to the event period but instead a considerable post-
recommendation drift is observed. Consistent with Stickel (1995), the effect appears to 
be significantly larger for smaller stocks (Womack, 1996). This finding indicates that 
there are fewer alternative information sources available for small stocks. Further analysis 
by Francis and Soffer (1997) shows that the informativeness of analyst recommendations 
stems from the revision of recommendation rather than from the absolute level of recom-
mendation. However, a more recent study by Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2010) evi-
dences the opposite that both recommendation revisions and levels have value.  
 
Extending on the characteristics of analyst recommendations, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find 
that analysts tend to prefer growth and glamour stocks. Positive correlation with momen-
tum indicators and negative correlation with contrarian indicators are documented. Fur-
thermore, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) show that firms favored by analysts tend to outperform 
unfavored firms for which the researchers present two alternative explanations: (1) rec-
ommendations incorporate qualitative information about the firms that quantitative 
measures cannot control for, or (2) recommendation changes and subsequent marketing 
of these stocks itself causes the subsequent price drift. 
 
Barber et al. (2001) test for the value of analyst recommendations in practice by forming 
two investment portfolios consisting of the most and least favorable consensus rating 
stocks. They find that the most (least) favorable consensus portfolio produces significant 
positive (negative) abnormal returns, evidencing that analyst recommendations have 
value. However, after controlling for transaction costs they find no statistically significant 
abnormal returns for either strategy. Moreover, Barber et al. (2001) argue that even 
though the average investor cannot constantly exploit these strategies due to transaction 
costs, those investors who are already determined to buy or sell a stock can because they 
will incur transaction costs nevertheless. Similar tests and findings of analyst recommen-
dations having predictive power are reported in Green (2006), Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) 
and Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2010). Furthermore, Jordan, Liu and Wu (2012) find 
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that institutional investors follow the opinions of to their own analysts, which further 
strengthens the evidence of the value of analyst recommendations. 
 
Some contradictory evidence is also documented. Baker and Dumont (2014) find an in-
consistency by showing that analysts’ hold recommendations consistently outperform 
buy recommendations, therefore suggesting that analyst recommendations do not have 
value and instead can actually be misleading. In a recent study, Altınkılıç, Hansen and 
Ye (2016) find that analyst recommendations are not informative anymore, and they ar-
gue that it is due to the increase of algorithmic trading which more efficiently corrects the 
pricing of assets. In other words, they posit that the average investor cannot reliably ben-
efit from analyst recommendations anymore because algorithms instantly arbitrage these 
opportunities away.  
 
In addition to recommendations and earnings forecasts, analysts issue target prices for the 
stocks they cover. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) find that even if there already exists a 
recommendation, or earnings forecast, price targets still contain valuable information to 
the markets. Moreover, price target revision of an equal percentage to earnings forecast 
revision is actually found to exert larger stock price reactions. 
 
 
2.2 Research quality and conflicts of interest 
 
Even though some recent studies (e.g. Baker & Dumont, 2014; Altınkılıç, Hansen & Ye, 
2016) have found some contradicting evidence, the overall consensus expects that equity 
research does have investment value as analysts search and process information on behalf 
of those investors utilizing the research. The value proposition lies in analysts’ capability 
of discovering and sharing valuable insights into the target companies. However, the fea-
sibility of the information is dependent on the analysts’ priorities being aligned with the 
investors. Therefore, any conflicts of interest pose a threat for the quality and value of the 
information in practice. 
 
In defining the quality of equity research, a viable concept from a related field of study is 
utilized. In audit literature, DeAngelo (1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1981) posit that 
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audit quality is dependent on two factors: auditor’s independence and competence. DeAn-
gelo (1981) argues that the value of audit is dependent on auditor discovering possible 
errors and subsequently disclosing the discovered errors. Similarly, Watts and Zimmer-
man (1981) present this paradigm of audit quality as a probability formula, where the 
probability of auditor reporting a breach is dependent on the probability of auditor actu-
ally discovering a breach and on the probability of the auditor then reporting the breach 
honestly. In other words, the analogy is that even if the auditor is independent from the 
audit subject, poor competence can still decrease the quality of the audit and, vice versa, 
high level of dependency to the audit subject can offset even a good level of competence. 
 
The analogy is the same for the quality of equity research – the same two components 
together compose valuable equity research. The concept is not totally new for the field of 
equity research studies, although it has not been expressed as explicitly as in audit litera-
ture. Prior research (e.g. Lin & McNichols, 1998; Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2008; Ko-
lasinski & Kothari, 2008) have measured analysts’ independence by analyzing different 
type of research firms’ average recommendations. Furthermore, analysts’ competence has 
been measured by examining the short or long-term performance of their recommenda-
tions or target price estimates (e.g. Michaely & Womack, 1999; Barber, Lehavy & True-
man, 2007; Cliff, 2007) and the accuracy of their earnings forecasts (e.g. Cowen, Groys-
berg & Healy, 2007; Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008). Performance measures contain rein-
forcing information about analyst independence since for a conflicted analyst it is ex-
pected that their performance is inferior compared to non-conflicted analysts’. In conclu-
sion, the audit quality concept works as a good framework for measuring equity research 
quality and the approach is applied in this study as the definition for analyst independence 
and the value of their research. 
 
Figure 2 below illustrates the relation of these two factors. Shortfall in the independence 
factor increases the probability that a conflict of interest exists as denoted by the grey 
area. In this case the theoretical value of equity research is mitigated by the possible con-
flicts of interest. Furthermore, a shortfall in either factor is prone to decrease the value of 
the research and, vice versa, the value increases when either factor increases, in essence, 
when moving towards the top right corner in Figure 2. The primary objective in this study 
is to measure research firms’ performance in relation to their independence to examine 
whether analysts have been able to provide value to investors with good quality research 
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or not, and whether analyst independence has had a significant effect in the value pro-
vided. Independence factor is measured by examining recommendation and target price 
averages. Moreover, analysts’ recommendation performance in both short and long-term 
is measured, which provides evidence on analysts’ competence, and also strengthening 
evidence on their independence. 
 
 
Figure 2. Research quality framework 
 
In analyzing the value of equity research, especially from a retail investor’s perspective, 
a third variable in addition to competence and independence must also be considered. As 
new information is the primary driver for changes in asset prices, new information in-
cluding analyst research has the greatest value potential at the time of releasing the infor-
mation after which it starts fading. This means that if the market learns of the new infor-
mation before a public release, the value at the time of the public release decreases. In the 
case of equity research analyst tipping or information leaking has been suggested to hap-
pen when analyst firms have strong relationships with either large institutional traders 
(Irvine, Lipson, Puckett, 2007), short sellers (Christophe, Ferri & Hsieh, 2010) or options 
traders (Lung & Xu, 2014; Lin & Lu, 2015).  
 
However, another alternative is that the market learns of the research process itself, in 
essence, the market learns when a research process in on-going and begins to predict its 
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outcome. This could happen for a few reasons: (1) most analyst outputs are often dis-
closed immediately after a public release by the company (Soltes, 2014), (2) analysts 
often engage in private communication with company management during the process of 
writing a research report (Soltes, 2014; Brown et al., 2015), and (3) companies itself ac-
tively engage with the analysts to influence their reports (Brown et al., 2018). In conclu-
sion, even though if the upcoming recommendation revision is fairly disclosed, the mar-
ket (or some market participants) might learn of the on-going research process in advance 
and learning of the research process could then help the market predict the outcome of 
the upcoming revision. 
 
 
2.2.1 Competence and behavioral biases 
 
Competence 
Systematic differences in analyst forecast accuracy are not generally found in early stud-
ies on analysts’ performance (see a list of studies in Clement, 1999, p. 286). However, 
more recent studies have identified some systematic differences (Stickel, 1992; Sinha, 
Brown & Das, 1997; Mikhail, Walther & Willis, 1997, 2004; Clement, 1999; Mozes, 
2003; Barber et al., 2006; Clement, Hales & Xue, 2011; Hilary & Hsu, 2013; Bradley, 
Gokkaya & Liu, 2016).  
 
Stickel (1992) finds that the Institutional Investor’s list of All-American Research Team1 
analysts forecast earnings more accurately than other investors. Furthermore, All-Amer-
icans have a greater impact on stock prices, and a positive relation between analyst repu-
tation and performance is found as well as with analyst pay and performance. In another 
study, Sinha, Brown & Das (1997) show that analysts with superior ex-ante performance 
remain superior ex-post the inspection period, suggesting that some analysts are able to 
consistently outperform other analysts. Similar findings are presented in Mikhail, Walther 
and Willis (1997; 2004). Clement (1999) builds on these papers and finds that analysts’ 
experience and employer size increase the analysts’ forecast accuracy and the number of 
firms and industries followed decreases it. 
                                                 
1 The Institutional Investor is an international publisher of premium journalism, newsletters and research 
in the field of finance. The All-American Research Team is an annual list of the best financial analysts in 
the US market as ranked by the Institutional Investor. 
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In contrast, Jacob, Lys and Neale (1999) find the opposite that analysts generally do not 
learn-by-doing, suggesting that experience is not related to forecast accuracy. They dis-
cuss that possible reason for this is because Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2004) include 
only analysts who survive for long periods, which means that underperforming analysts 
who have been replaced are not included in the sample, and because Clement (1999) does 
not control for all other analyst characteristics. In a more recent study Bradley, Gokkaya 
and Liu (2016) show that analysts’ industry experience prior to working in equity research 
is positively related to forecast accuracy and to market reactions to forecast revisions. 
 
Mozes (2003) takes an alternative approach and studies the speed at which analysts react 
to new public information by revising their forecasts and finds that forecast immediacy 
is negatively related to forecast accuracy. Mozes (2003) challenges the thinking of supe-
rior and inferior analysts with an alternative argument of two types of analysts: (1) ana-
lysts who emphasize usefulness (as measured by forecast immediacy) over forecast ac-
curacy, in other words, provide analyses to the market quickly after new public infor-
mation, and (2) analysts who emphasize forecast accuracy over usefulness, in other 
words, spend more time analyzing the new information. Moreover, Clement, Hales and 
Xue (2011) document that one source of analyst expertise is interpreting and supplement-
ing information from other analysts to issue relatively more accurate forecasts than their 
peers, which is consistent with the forecast immediacy hypothesis of slower analysts be-
ing more accurate. 
 
In conclusion, there may exist consistent differences between analysts’ competence and 
emphasis, and investors ought to make sure to account for these in their decision making. 
Consistent analysts add more value (Hilary & Hsu, 2013) and it should be in investors’ 
interest to look for these analysts. In addition, Barber et al. (2006) find that recommen-
dation upgrades (downgrades) from analyst firms that issue the smallest percentage of 
buy recommendations significantly outperform (underperform) other analyst firms, evi-
dencing that more conservative research firms provide more value with their recommen-
dations. 
 
Behavioral biases 
Analysts face several behavioral biases which affect their ability to act rationally and 
produce value to investors. In certain situations analysts have been found to overreact (De 
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Bondt & Thaler, 1990) and, on the other hand, underreact (Abarbanell & Bernard, 1992). 
More specifically analysts tend to underreact to negative information and overreact to 
positive (Easterwood & Nutt, 1999). Furthermore, analysts have been documented to herd 
with other analysts when issuing either earnings forecasts (Trueman, 1994; Clement & 
Tse, 2005) or recommendations (Welch, 2000; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010; Xue, 2017). For 
earnings forecasting, Clarke & Subramanian (2006) have document a U-shaped relation 
between analysts’ employment risk and forecast boldness, which shows that analysts with 
very high or low employment risk are more likely to issue bold forecasts. In addition, 
Hilary and Hsu (2013) find that analysts consistently bias their forecasts downwards in 
order to be more consistent.  
 
On a more practical level, Hirshleifer et al. (2019) document that analysts grow weary 
during the day and encounter decision fatigue, resulting in forecast accuracy declining 
over the course of the day. In addition, even weather conditions are documented to affect 
analyst activities. Presence of bad weather conditions at the time of an earnings announce-
ment induces slower or lower probability of analyst responding to the announcement 
compared to analysts who experience pleasant weather conditions (Dehaan, Madsen & 
Piotroski, 2017). Taken together these behavioral biases evidence that analysts are “de-
cidedly human” (De Bondt & Thaler, 1990, p. 57), and therefore irrational behavior can, 
and should, be expected from time to time. 
 
 
2.2.2 Independence and conflicts of interest 
 
In order for analyst research to be of high quality and valuable to investors the analyst 
must be independent, in essence, no conflicts should affect the analyst’s view. Concerns 
of analyst conflicts voiced by the financial press (see, e.g., Lin & McNichols, 1998) led 
to various studies into brokerage2 analysts’ possible conflicts of interest. A conflict of 
interest as defined by Mehran and Stulz (2007, p. 268) is “-- a situation in which a party 
to a transaction can potentially gain by taking actions that adversely affect its counter-
                                                 
2 The term “brokerage” refers to all firms engaging in any sort of brokering activities, for example, invest-
ment banking or stock brokering. 
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party”. In equity research the situation exists whenever an analyst is able to gain some-
thing by reporting biased research. Conflicts of interest in equity research have been doc-
umented to stem from either investment banking services or trading incentives (e.g. Lin 
& McNichols, 1998; Irvine, 2004; Brown et al., 2018). 
 
Investment banking business 
Investment banks provide services to other companies when they are faced with more 
complex financial transactions, for example, raising new capital, sale of securities, or 
mergers and acquisitions. A plethora of studies have examined if investment banking ser-
vices induce conflicts of interest for the research analysts employed by the banks (Dugar 
& Nathan, 1995; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Carleton, Chen & Steiner, 1998; Michaely & 
Womack, 1999; Boni & Womack, 2002; Hong & Kubik, 2003; O’Brien, McNichols & 
Lin, 2005; Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm, 2006; Barber, Lehavy & Trueman, 2007; 
Cliff, 2007; Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok, 2007; Ljunqvist et al., 2007; Agrawal & 
Chen, 2008; Corwin, Larocque & Stegemoller, 2017).  
 
Dugar and Nathan (1995) find that investment banking (“IB”) analysts are more optimis-
tic than other analysts, although the subsequent stock returns do not differ between the 
groups. Similar findings are presented in Lin and McNichols (1998), who find that IB 
analysts issue on average more optimistic recommendations. Furthermore, no differences 
are identified in either earnings forecasts or post-recommendation returns. Consistently, 
Carleton, Chen and Steiner (1998) find that IB analysts issue more optimistic recommen-
dations. However, in contrast to earlier studies their study also documents inferior per-
formance by IB analyst recommendations compared to other analysts. Inferior perfor-
mance by IB analyst recommendations is also documented by Barber, Lehavy and True-
man (2007), Cliff (2007) and Agrawal and Chen (2008). The inferior long-term perfor-
mance indicates that IB analysts are not better stock pickers than independent even though 
they are found to be more optimistic. 
 
Similarly, Michaely and Womack (1999) evidence that IB relationships result in biased 
recommendations and that their performance is inferior compared to other analysts. They 
discuss three possible explanations for this bias. The first explanation states that IB ana-
lysts could face a cognitive bias in that they genuinely believe that their IB clients are 
better firms than other firms they do not engage in business with. On the other hand, the 
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second explanation states that the favorable recommendations itself cause the client firms 
to choose the investment bank over others (selection bias), resulting in the association 
between optimistic views and IB relationships. Furthermore, the third explanation is the 
intentional conflict of interest hypothesis that investment bankers pressure their analysts 
to issue more optimistic views to enhance client relationships. 
 
Boni and Womack (2002) surveyed a group of buy-side investment professionals on an-
alyst conflicts of interest. The survey shows that majority of the professionals believe that 
analysts buy recommendations rarely have value. In addition, when asked about analysts’ 
motivation majority believes that analysts are mostly motivated by attracting and retain-
ing IB clients and increasing IB sales. The finding suggests that these professionals not 
only acknowledge IB analysts’ conflicts of interest, but also believe that they are a moti-
vation for their actions. Moreover, over half of the professionals believe that independent 
analyst research is more valuable, and that the demand for independent research will in-
crease in the future.  
 
Further evidence on analysts’ motivation to report biased recommendations is presented 
by Hong and Kubik (2003), who find that investment banks do not solely care for ana-
lysts’ accuracy but also reward for their optimism. Similarly, Brown et al. (2018) find 
that analyst compensation is often dependent on generating other business for the firm. 
Other effects in addition to optimistic recommendations are also reported. O’Brien 
McNichols and Lakonishok (2005) find that investment banking relationships increase 
analysts’ reluctance to disclose negative news. Furthermore, Chan, Karceski and 
Lakonishok (2007) show that analysts use earnings forecasts to win investment banking 
business, as well as that conflicts of interest are more pronounced for growth stocks and 
during economic boom periods.  
 
Some contradictory findings also exist. Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006) do not 
find that greater optimism leads to more IB business, but instead has the opposite effect. 
The research argues this is due to a reputational effect, meaning that banks and analysts 
have an incentive to build their reputation, which prevents them from reporting biased 
research. Nevertheless, analysts with higher IB business potential still issued more opti-
mistic recommendations. Similarly, Ljungqvist et al. (2007) find that even though IB an-
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alysts tend to be more optimistic, this effect is at least partially moderated by the reputa-
tional effect and the presence of institutional investors. However, for firms with large 
retail investor ownership and relationships with smaller investment banks, the conflicts 
still exist. 
 
In conclusion, the evidence on investment banking relationships and analyst research is 
mostly in favor of the conflicts of interest hypothesis. Even after the regulators stepped 
in and sanctioned the ten largest investment banks in the US, conflicts of interest have 
prevailed in all other investment banks, which is evidence of the deep-reaching roots of 
the phenomenon (Corwin, Larocque & Stegemoller, 2017). Furthermore, the effects of 
these conflicts are more pronounced for retail investors who are unable to account for the 
possible biases unlike institutional investors who properly discount the opinions of con-
flicted analysts (Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2007). 
 
Trading incentives 
Even if the research firm does not have investment banking business, it might still offer 
stock brokering services. Previous studies have acknowledged these services as another 
source for conflicts of interest (Hayes, 1998; Irvine, 2004; Jackson; 2005; Brown et al., 
2018). Hayes (1998) develops a model where she examines the effect of trading incen-
tives on analysts’ production of information. She finds that these incentives lead analysts 
to produce information that maximizes the generated trading volume. Moreover, trading 
commissions can be maximized by issuing biased earnings forecasts, and the marginal 
return for the analyst is better when covering stocks that perform well, in other words 
positive views lead to higher trading volumes than pessimistic.  
 
Irvine (2004) tests Hayes’ model in practice and finds that, in contrast to Hayes’ predic-
tion, biasing earnings forecasts does not generate more trading. On the other hand, he 
does find that issuing buy recommendations generates significantly more trading com-
missions than other recommendations. Consistent with Hayes (1998), Irvine (2004) con-
cludes that trading incentives can be a significant factor for inducing biased research. 
Consistent with Irvine (2004), Jackson (2005) finds that analyst optimism leads to in-
creased trading volumes for the analyst’s firm. However, he also finds that in doing so 
the analyst incurs a loss in reputation. Jackson (2005) argues that the only thing prevent-
ing an analyst from submitting to the trading incentives is increasing the importance of 
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the reputational effect, which could be achieved by making analyst forecasting track rec-
ord more transparent to investors. In doing so the expected reputational loss increases and 
the analyst will not give in to the incentives in the fear of major reputational loss. Fur-
thermore, Brown et al. (2018) find that analyst compensation is often linked to their abil-
ity to generate trading commissions. 
 
 
2.3 Regulatory environment concerning equity analysts 
 
After the stock market bubble in the early 2000s, regulators begun to take more interest 
in the financial market regulations, and even more after the financial crisis in 2007. New 
regulations were introduced to prevent similar kind of market crashes from happening 
again. The most relevant regulatory changes concerning equity analysts have been the 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) in 2000, NASD rule 2711 and NYSE rule 472 in 
20023, the Global Research Analyst Settlement in 2003 and the Markets in Financial In-
struments Directive II (“MiFID II”) that was first introduced in 2007 and later amended 
in 2018. The former three are regulations introduced in the US and the latter one in the 
EU, although all of them have induced similar regulatory developments in other countries 
as well. In practice, the general principles and regulations that analysts follow are similar 
in all (western) markets, and new developments in one market are apt to cause similar 
changes in other markets as well. 
 
Reg FD was a new rule enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
in the US in 2000. The primary focus of the rule was to prevent companies from disclos-
ing material information to selected parties, for example, in conference calls, meetings 
with institutional investors, or meetings with analysts, by making it mandatory to issue 
all material information fairly to all market participants at the same time (SEC, 2000). 
This change decreased the informational advantage analysts had over common investors 
since analysts were not be able to receive material information in private discussions an-
ymore. This in turn should decrease the value of analyst research, since analysts have less 
new information to offer, or at least shift the focus of the value creation to interpreting 
                                                 
3 These rules have been since superseded by FINRA rule 2241 in 2015 which is primarily similar to the 
original rules. 
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public information rather than discovering new information. However, even after the Reg 
FD, analysts still engage in private communications with company management and an-
alysts consider these discussions to provide more value than public disclosures alone 
(Soltes, 2014; Brown et al., 2015). On the other hand, Arand, Kerl and Walter (2015) 
show that the level of investor protection by regulators is positively associated with the 
informativeness of analyst research. This is consistent with Madura and Premti (2014) 
who find that the Reg FD decreased the magnitude of information leakages prior to rec-
ommendation revisions, and therefore common investors are able to derive more value 
from analyst research. 
 
NASD rule 2711 and NYSE rule 472 directly governed the relationships between invest-
ment banking and research departments. The purpose of the rules was to prevent invest-
ment bankers from pressuring equity analysts to issue more favorable recommendations. 
The rules stated, for example, that a research analyst cannot be subject to supervision or 
control by an investment banker and that non-research personnel are not allowed to re-
view or influence the formulation of research reports and recommendations (FINRA, 
2019). Furthermore, following a series of investigations into investment bank conflicts of 
interest, a collection of regulators settled with ten of the largest investment banks in the 
US. The settlement which amounted up to 1,4 billion dollars in monetary terms also con-
sisted of structural reforms for the organizations to further separate equity research and 
investment banking departments within the firms (SEC, 2003). 
 
Following these regulatory reforms, Kadan et al. (2009) show that the regulations were 
successful at decreasing conflicts of interest and relative optimism by investment bank 
analysts. However, at the same time the overall informativeness of analyst recommenda-
tions has declined (Kadan et al., 2009). Similarly, Clarke et al. (2011) document that after 
the regulations affiliated analysts have issued fewer optimistic recommendations and that 
the overall market reaction to analyst recommendations has declined. Furthermore, Guan, 
Lu and Wong (2012) show that even though optimism has decreased, the accuracy of 
investment bank forecasts has also declined, and the performance of their recommenda-
tions has remained unchanged. This finding suggests that investors do not gain benefits 
even though investment bank optimism has decreased. In contrast, Lee, Strong and Zhu 
(2014) evidence that analyst forecast accuracy increased post-regulation, although con-
sistent with Kadan et al. (2009) they find that the overall informativeness and stock price 
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drift after recommendations has declined. In a more recent study, Corwin, Larocque and 
Stegemoller (2017) evidence that even though recommendation optimism decreased after 
the settlement in the sanctioned banks, it did not reduce optimism in non-sanctioned 
banks. 
 
The introduction of MiFID II legislation in 2018 further separates the investment banking 
and equity research departments within banks. The revised legislation prevents banks 
from covering their research costs with other services of the firm, for example, with trad-
ing commissions or IB advisory revenues. Alternatively, the research services must be 
priced separately. This change has led to drops in the amount of research analysts, which 
some investment professionals believe weakens the quality of the research and decreases 
the available information in the markets, especially of small and medium sized companies 
(Financial Times, 2018; Bloomberg, 2019). This creates a pressure for brokerage firms 
to come up with new business models to sustain their research services or to refrain from 
offering research services altogether. However, it is still unknown what kind of effect 
MiFID II will have in overall once the industry conforms with the new regulation. 
 
In conclusion, the regulatory changes have had positive effects on the capital markets as 
conflicts of interest have reduced and information has become more fairly available to all 
market participants. However, the effect on research analysts has not been as favorable. 
Recently many research firms have been cutting their research staff and decreasing stock 
coverage whilst having to look into developing new business models to sustain the ser-
vices, for example, by charging the target companies for their coverage. 
 
 
2.4 Independent equity research 
 
There exist multiple definitions for independent equity firms which complicates the com-
parability of the results between the studies. Some researchers define independent re-
search through affiliation to the research subject (e.g. Michaely & Womack, 1999), which 
means that if the firm providing the research does not have any other business with the 
research subject, the research firm is considered independent. However, this definition 
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does not consider the characteristics of the research firms nor the possibility that recom-
mendations are inflated to win more future business. Another group of researchers 
acknowledge these concerns to some extent and define independents as firms that do not 
engage in investment banking activities (e.g. Barber, Lehavy & Trueman, 2007). Problem 
with this definition is that firms with stock brokering services are categorized as inde-
pendent research firms even though there is a possibility that trading incentives (e.g. Ir-
vine, 2004) could still create a conflict of interest for the analysts. The last definition 
considers all these problems and defines (pure) independents as those firms that do not 
engage in any other business other than equity research (e.g. Cowen, Groysberg & Healy, 
2006). 
 
 
2.4.1 Division based on affiliation 
 
Majority of prior literature have adopted the first definition for independent research (Lin 
& McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 1999; Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2003; Cliff, 
2007; Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2008; Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008; Kadan et al., 2009). 
Lin and McNichols (1998) are amongst the first ones to compare the recommendation 
performance of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Scope of their study is twofold: to 
examine if affiliated analysts issue more favorable forecasts and recommendations, and 
how investors respond to recommendations by these two groups of analysts. Lin and 
McNichols (1998) show that even though affiliated analysts issue significantly more fa-
vorable recommendations, the post-announcement stock price performances do not gen-
erally differ between affiliated and unaffiliated. The research concludes that even though 
affiliated analysts are evidenced to issue more optimistic recommendations, their post-
announcement returns underperform only in the announcement period, but no differences 
are identified in long-term returns.  
 
Michaely and Womack (1999) also acknowledge that investment bank analysts might 
face an implicit pressure to issue positive recommendations for investment banking client 
in order to maintain good client relationships. The researchers are especially concerned 
about the trend of using analysts as part of the marketing and due diligence processes in 
investment banking assignments. By examining the immediate and long-run excess price 
reaction to affiliated and unaffiliated buy recommendations, the research documents a 
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clear pattern between the two groups: unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations outperform 
those of affiliated analysts in all examined time periods (Michaely & Womack, 1999). 
The effect is both economically and statistically significant after controlling for IPO and 
industry characteristics, which is in contrast to Lin and McNichols (1998) who do not 
find differences in post-announcement returns. 
 
Bradley, Jordan & Ritter (2003) study IPO returns following the end of the quiet period 
and apply a number of tests to analyze the impact of analyst recommendations. First, they 
find that affiliated analysts issue more optimistic recommendations on average, although 
the difference to unaffiliated is very small and therefore not so aggravating evidence of 
conflicts of interest. Second, by studying the cumulative market adjusted returns 
(“CMAR”) for a 5-day window around the end of the quiet period the research shows that 
firms with coverage initiated yield a significant abnormal return of 4.1 percent. However, 
the research does not find support to the conflict of interest hypothesis since after con-
trolling for the number of coverage initiations, affiliation to the research subject does not 
have a significant effect on the return (Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2003). It is important to 
note that the study examines only initiations of analyst coverage and does not analyze the 
long-term returns nor the effect of subsequent analyst recommendation revisions. 
 
Cliff (2007) argues that the existing literature on independent equity research has three 
important issues in measuring abnormal returns: (1) biased definition of the independent 
benchmark group, (2) use of arbitrary time periods, and (3) use of misspecified models. 
Due to these inadequacies, he augments the existing literature with a comprehensive com-
parison of independent and affiliated recommendations which accounts for these meth-
odological problems. Cliff (2007) applies a portfolio method for detecting differences 
between recommendations by independent and affiliated analysts and analyzes the long-
term performance of analyst recommendations. To account for possible use of a misspec-
ified model, the abnormal returns are estimated by using CAPM, Fama and French’s 
(1993) three-factor model and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. 
 
Cliff (2007) finds that even though the raw performance of the independent buy portfolio 
indicates that it outperforms the affiliated portfolio, the portfolio does not generate statis-
tically significant abnormal returns. In overall, the performance of the independent port-
folios is neutral. On the other hand, affiliated buy portfolio generates significant negative 
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abnormal returns which supports the conflict of interest hypothesis. The affiliated outper-
form the independent only with the sell portfolio as the affiliated generate significant 
negative abnormal returns compared to the neutral performance of the independent port-
folio. In conclusion, the findings are consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis, 
documenting excessive optimism by the affiliated analysts buy recommendations. Even 
though the study supports the conflict of interest hypothesis, Cliff (2007) points out that 
by focusing solely on the period after the regulatory changes the affiliated recommenda-
tions seem to become more credible.  
 
Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2008) study analysts’ behavior following IPOs and provide 
insight into analysts’ conflict of interest. Consistent with Lin and McNichols (1998) and 
Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003), the study documents that affiliated analysts issue more 
optimistic recommendations than unaffiliated, although the difference is small. Further-
more, the research shows that the market reaction is greater for unaffiliated analysts dur-
ing IPO quiet period and, conversely, greater for affiliated analysts in post-quiet period. 
The research argues that the market predicts initiations from affiliated analysts following 
an IPO and hence returns are low during IPO quiet period, but after the quiet period the 
recommendations become more unpredictable. Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2008) con-
clude that after controlling for timing factors the market does not appear to discount rec-
ommendations from affiliated analysts. The finding is consistent with Lin and McNichols 
(1998) but in contrast to the findings of a similar study by Michaely and Womack (1999). 
 
In relation to the finding, Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2008) argue that unaffiliated ana-
lysts may actually be just as conflicted as affiliated analysts since it is in their interest to 
catch the attention of the company management to win more future business. On the other 
hand, they also point out that market practices have changed due to regulatory changes, 
and therefore the incentive to issue optimistic recommendations in hopes of winning fu-
ture business has since decreased. Nevertheless, the argument is one of the first ones to 
address that the division based on only current affiliation to the research subject may not 
be a valid definition for independent research. 
 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) study analysts’ conflict of interest by comparing affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts’ behavior around merger and acquisition (“M&A”) deals. First, 
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the research finds that analysts affiliated with the acquirer company more likely to up-
grade the acquirer’s recommendation within 90 days of an all-cash M&A deal. Second, 
affiliation to the target company is found to increase the odds that an analyst will upgrade 
the acquirer’s recommendation after the exchange ratio is fixed in a stock swap deal. 
Third, the research finds no evidence that affiliation around M&A deals affects analysts 
long or short-term growth or earnings forecasts. Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) conclude 
that M&A relationships have a significant impact on analysts’ objectivity in regard to 
recommendations and hence supports the conflict of interest hypothesis. 
 
Kadan et al. (2009) study the effect of the global research analyst settlement and related 
regulatory changes on analysts’ recommendations and conflicts of interest. The research 
examines stock recommendations and subsequent stock price reactions before and after 
the regulatory changes. First, the research finds that recommendations have become more 
balanced as analysts issue less optimistic recommendations than before. Furthermore, op-
timistic recommendations have become more informative, whereas pessimistic ratings 
have become less informative. Second, the research shows that after the regulative 
changes, affiliated analysts are no longer more likely to issue more optimistic ratings than 
unaffiliated, although affiliated are still less likely to issue pessimistic ratings. In sum, 
Kadan et al. (2009) document weak evidence of potential conflicts of interest still exist-
ing. In addition, the research shows that following the regulative changes the overall in-
formativeness of analyst recommendations has declined. 
 
 
2.4.2 Division based on investment banking services 
 
The second definition for independent research became more popular after researchers 
acknowledged that conflicts may originate from the pressure of trying to win future in-
vestment banking business for the bank (Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2008). More recent 
studies into analyst conflicts of interest have adopted this definition (Barber, Lehavy & 
Trueman, 2007; Agrawal & Chen, 2008; Clarke et al., 2011).  
 
Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007) find that buy recommendations by independent re-
search firms result in statistically significant higher abnormal returns compared to rec-
ommendations by investment banks. On the other hand, hold and sell recommendations 
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by independent research firms underperform those of investment banks by a large and 
statistically significant amount. In conclusion, Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007) posit 
that investment bank analysts are more optimistic in issuing buy recommendations than 
independent analysts, although they also point out that the results might reflect hindsight 
bias due to the relatively narrow time period studied. 
 
Agrawal and Chen (2008) argue that in order for stock research to impact investor behav-
ior, the presumption that analysts respond to conflicts of interest by inflating their recom-
mendations is not sufficient alone. In addition, investors should take analysts’ recommen-
dations at face value, since it is possible that investors understand and account for the 
possible conflicts of interest by discounting the analysts’ opinions. In testing their hy-
potheses, Agrawal and Chen (2008) show that the levels of IB and trading commissions 
revenues are positively related to stock recommendations, indicating that greater conflicts 
of interest cause analysts to inflate their recommendations. Furthermore, greater percent-
age of investment banking or brokerage commissions revenues is found to be negatively 
correlated with announcement period returns. The finding suggests that investors gener-
ally understand the possibility of conflict of interest and rationally discount this from the 
opinions of the analysts. Other findings from the control variables show that the size of 
the analyst firm is positively (negatively) and the size of the company followed is nega-
tively (positively) correlated with the market reaction to recommendation upgrades 
(downgrades). (Agrawal & Chen, 2008.) 
 
In conclusion, the findings of Agrawal and Chen (2008) do suggest that analysts face 
conflicts of interest and generally respond by inflating recommendations. However, in-
vestors are not misled by this as they account for this effect by rationally discounting the 
opinions of potentially conflicted analysts. The rational discounting finding is partly con-
sistent with Michaely and Womack (1999), who find that investors discount the opinions 
of affiliated analysts, but inconsistent with Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2008), who find 
that investors generally do not discount the opinions of analysts. 
 
Clarke et al. (2011) study the characteristics and market reaction to analyst recommenda-
tions before and after the global research analyst settlement and in addition examine the 
behavior of independent research firms following the settlement. Prior to regulatory 
changes the market reaction to recommendation upgrades is not significantly different 
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between different analyst types. However, market reaction to affiliated analyst down-
grades is significantly larger than to unaffiliated or independent analyst downgrades. Af-
ter the regulatory changes the return on affiliated analyst upgrades is significantly in-
creased and for downgrades the returns are significantly less negative for all analyst types, 
which suggests that post-regulation downgrades are not seen as informational as pre-reg-
ulation downgrades. In addition, Clarke et al. (2011) examine the market reaction to 
newly established independent analyst firm recommendations in the post-regulation pe-
riod and the analysis shows that new independents’ recommendation upgrades and down-
grades are viewed as less informative than those of other analysts. 
 
Clarke et al. (2011) conclude that even though a certain level of conflict of interest is 
theoretically expected from affiliated analysts, independent analysts’ recommendations 
are still viewed as less informative in the post-regulation period. This finding is consistent 
with Kadan et al. (2009). However, the research heavily relies on the finding that newly 
established firms’ recommendations result in lesser market reactions. This raises the 
question whether the lesser reactions are in fact due to inferior independent firm quality, 
or instead due to the fact that the market considers these new research firms as less cred-
ible until quality is proven with a good track record of recommendations. 
 
 
2.4.3 Pure independent research 
 
The last definition for independent research takes into account the possibility that trading 
incentives may induce conflicts of interest for the analysts. This definition has not been 
as popular due to the small amount of purely independent research firms, and studies 
using the definition often point out that the findings are not fully robust due to small 
sample sizes (e.g. Cowen, Groysberg & Healy, 2006). However, some studies have still 
adopted this definition (Carleton, Chen & Steiner, 1998; Clarke et al., 2004; Cowen, 
Groysberg & Healy, 2006; Jacob, Rock & Weber, 2008; Casey 2013; Liu & Peabody, 
2015). 
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Carleton, Chen and Steiner (1998) division analyst firms to brokerage and independent 
firms on the basis if they operate on sell-side or buy-side4. Their study is one of the first 
ones to compare the research of sell-side banking firms with buy-side firms that are inde-
pendent of other possibly conflicting services. The researchers expect that buy-side ana-
lysts do not feel the same pressure as banking analysts to inflate recommendations, since 
their sole motivation is to find the most profitable investment opportunities. The findings 
of Carleton, Chen and Steiner (1998) suggest that brokerage analysts face a conflict of 
interest due to which their recommendations are biased with excessive optimism as com-
pared to those of independent non-brokerage analysts. 
 
However, even though the division to sell-side and buy-side is valid for research, since 
buy-side analysts have no other interests other than to find the most profitable investment 
opportunities, it is challenging to adopt implications of the study into practice for com-
mon investors because buy-side recommendations are not generally made public as they 
occur. Instead, the recommendations are used to benefit the buy-side firm itself. For com-
mon investors to be able to benefit from independent research the firm providing the re-
search should be willing to share its analyses to the public. 
 
Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006) identify the need to study purely independent re-
search firms to better understand if analyst optimism is driven by conflicts of interest. 
They are one of the first ones to study independent sell-side research firms separately. 
The empirical findings suggest that investment banks actually make less optimistic earn-
ings forecasts than brokerage or independent firms. On the other hand, investment banks 
are shown to issue more optimistic recommendations, although the study only focuses on 
the amount of recommendations and does not evaluate their post-announcement perfor-
mance. Furthermore, Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006) show that brokerage analysts 
are the most optimistic, indicating that trading incentives are the most important cause 
for conflicts of interest. The findings indicate that independent analysts are likely to have 
less conflicts of interest, although the tests conducted for independent analysts are not 
fully robust due to small sample size. 
 
                                                 
4 Sell-side refers to firms that offer services to external parties (e.g. investment banks) when the external 
party is about to or considering executing some kind of transaction or investment, whereas buy-side refers 
to firms that are itself looking for potential investments (e.g. private equity firms). 
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Contradictory findings are presented in the working paper of Clarke et al. (2004). Unlike 
Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006), the study examines the immediate and one-year 
abnormal stock price reactions to recommendation revisions. The study finds that even 
though investment banks are shown to be more likely to issue buy recommendations, 
there is no significant difference in the post-announcement stock performance across any 
of the analyst types. In conclusion, Clarke et al. (2004) show that investment bank ana-
lysts are less optimistic than independent analysts. 
 
Consistent with Clarke et al. (2004), Jacob, Rock and Weber (2008) find similar evidence 
that investment banks provide more accurate earnings forecasts than independent. How-
ever, the study only examines analysts’ earnings forecasts and does not include examina-
tion of recommendations. Furthermore, Jacob, Rock and Weber (2008) suggest that the 
superiority of investment bank analysts is at least partially explained by three factors: (1) 
independent analysts’ relatively higher optimism, (2) IB analysts’ access to better re-
sources, and (3) IB analysts’ possible affiliation with the target providing them with in-
formational advantage, namely the superior information hypothesis. 
 
Casey (2013) also compares the performance of stock recommendation revisions by in-
vestment banks and pure independent research firms. Brokerage firms without IB busi-
ness are excluded from the study altogether. Univariate analysis in the study indicates 
that investment bank analysts have significantly more experience, work at larger firms, 
provide more timely recommendations, and make more accurate forecasts. The latter is 
consistent with Jacob, Rock and Weber (2008) and Clarke et al. (2004). Even after con-
trolling for analyst and firm specific characteristics, Casey (2013) finds that the initial 
market reaction to IB analysts’ recommendations is greater than to those of independent 
analysts. Furthermore, examination of long-term performance further strengthens the ev-
idence that IB analyst recommendations are more informative. Taken together the find-
ings of the study suggest that independent analysts’ recommendations are less informative 
than those of their investment banking counterparts’, which is consistent with Clarke et 
al. (2004) and Jacob, Rock and Weber (2008). 
 
In a more recent study Liu and Peabody (2015) apply a case study approach to evaluating 
the investment value of independent research by analyzing the equity recommendations 
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from the independent research firm Morningstar. The study differs from most other stud-
ies in the field since it does not compare the performance of independent and brokerage 
analyst recommendations, but instead focuses on evaluating the value of Morningstar’s 
research. First, the study shows that the distribution of different ratings is balanced and 
thus assumed not to be biased, which highlights the independence of Morningstar’s ana-
lysts. Second, and quite surprisingly so, the results suggest that the absolute performance 
of lowest rating portfolio actually outperforms the highest rating portfolio. After control-
ling for risk and firm characteristics, the results remain the same with each increase in 
stock rating decreasing the annualized portfolio return by 1.45 % on average. The poor 
performance of Morningstar’s independent analysts leads the researchers to conclude that 
independent recommendations might not provide value to investors, but instead could 
actually have the exactly opposite effect. (Liu & Peabody, 2015.) 
 
 
2.5 Literature review summary 
 
Synthesizing all the findings from the literature review, three key themes are identified. 
First, by examining analysts’ role in the capital markets, different dimensions to analysts’ 
role are identified. Most importantly analysts work as information intermediaries between 
companies and investors by providing new information and interpreting public infor-
mation (Ramnath, Rock & Shane, 2008). Analysts’ role as information intermediaries is 
found to provide value to investors (e.g. Womack, 1996). In addition, analysts have a 
monitoring role in companies’ corporate governance (Chen, Harford and Lin, 2015) and 
a marketer role by increasing the recognition of individual stocks (Li & Yue, 2015), and 
investing in general. Most common analyst outputs include (1) company prospects de-
scriptions, (2) earnings forecasts, (3) target prices and (4) recommendations, which to-
gether ultimately lead to publishing a research report (Ramnath, Rock & Shane, 2008). 
All of these content categories are found to provide value individually and in aggregate. 
In addition, analysts’ qualitative supporting arguments are found to be as valuable as the 
more visible and straightforward numerical outputs (Asquith, Mikhail & Au, 2005). 
 
  
 
33 
Second, it is shown that the value of analyst research is a function of analyst’s personal 
competence and independence from the research subject. Shortfall in either category in-
creases the probability of biased, inaccurate research. Furthermore, systematic differ-
ences in analysts’ competence are identified (e.g. Stickel, 1992; Clement, 1999). How-
ever, this could also be seen as analysts’ choice between emphasizing accuracy or useful-
ness in their research (Mozes, 2003). Common denominator is that differences do exists, 
and investors should pay attention to these when utilizing analyst research. Furthermore, 
more consistent and conservative analyst firms are found to provide more value (Hilary 
& Hsu, 2013; Barber et al., 2006). Analysts’ competence may also be deteriorated by 
behavioral biases such as over and underreacting (Easterwood & Nutt, 1999), or herding 
(Welch, 2000). Moreover, certain dependencies to the research subject are shown to ex-
pose the analyst to possible conflicts of interest in their research, which are shown to stem 
from brokerage services, more specifically from either investment banking services (e.g. 
Lin & McNichols, 1998) or trading incentives (e.g. Irvine, 2004). 
 
Third, in studies comparing the performance of potentially conflicted and independent 
analysts three definitions for independent research firms are identified: (1) firm is unaf-
filiated with the research subject, but may still engage in investment banking or other 
brokerage services with other firms (e.g. Michaely & Womack, 1999), (2) firm does not 
engage in investment banking activities, but may still have stock brokering services (e.g. 
Barber, Lehavy & Trueman, 2007), and (3) firm is purely independent from any other 
services apart from equity research (e.g. Cowen, Groysberg & Healy, 2007). In essence, 
the aim of these studies have been to examine whether there is evidence of the conflict of 
interest hypothesis which predicts that non-independent analysts bias their research and 
are overly optimistic, or of the superior information hypothesis which in turn states that 
possible ties to the research subjects provides the analysts with an informational ad-
vantage, leading to more accurate research (Michaely & Womack, 1999). 
 
Table 1 synthesizes the findings of the studies on the conflict of interest hypothesis. Ma-
jority of the studies find that conflicted analysts issue relatively more optimistic recom-
mendations and earnings forecasts (e.g. Lin & McNichols, 1998; Carleton, Chen & Stei-
ner, 1998; Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2003; Cliff 2007; Corwin, Larocque & Stegemoller, 
2017). Evidence on announcement period returns is slightly more ambiguous. In some 
studies, the market is shown to discount the conflicted analysts’ opinions (e.g. Dugar & 
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Nathan, 1995; Agrawal & Chen, 2008), whereas in others conflicted analysts generate 
larger returns (Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2008; Clarke et al., 2011), which in turn suggests 
that conflicted analysts would have superior information. However, long-term perfor-
mance analyzes show that brokerage analysts either underperform (e.g. Michaely & 
Womack, 1999; Barber, Lehavy & Trueman, 2007; Cliff, 2007) or that no difference in 
performance exists (e.g. Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Lin & McNichols, 1998) compared to 
independent, whereas findings of long-term outperformance by brokerage analysts are 
scarce (e.g. Casey, 2013). 
 
In conclusion, equity research is shown to have value and empirical evidence primarily 
supports this, although transaction costs usually diminish any abnormal returns. In addi-
tion, possible conflicts of interest are documented to affect the value. However, depend-
ing on the time period and method used the magnitude of the effect seems to vary con-
siderably. For this reason, the aim of this study is to further extend the evidence on analyst 
conflicts of interest and independent equity research to investigate whether investors are 
better served by independent research instead of possibly conflicted brokerage research. 
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2.6 Hypotheses 
 
Prior literature is primarily in favor of potentially conflicted brokerage analysts issuing 
relatively more optimistic recommendations (Michaely & Womack, 1997; Lin & 
McNichols, 1998; Barber, Lehavy & Trueman, 2007; Cliff, 2007). Trading incentives are 
also expected to influence analyst behavior, and create conflicts for the analysts (Hayes, 
1998; Irvine, 2004; Jackson; 2005). Moreover, even though target price revisions are not 
widely covered in prior literature, they are expected to behave similarly to recommenda-
tions due to their immediate relation to the level of recommendation being issued. There-
fore, the first hypothesis for this study is stated as: 
 
H1: Brokerage analysts issue more optimistic recommendations and target 
prices than independent analysts. 
 
Previous studies in the field have documented value in analyst research as measured by 
post-recommendation stock returns (Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001). The value is 
attributed to analysts’ role in providing the market with new information, interpreting 
public information or increasing the overall recognition of stocks (Asquith, Mikhail & 
Au, 2005; Frankel, Kothari & Weber, 2006; Li & You, 2015). As previously discussed, 
there are two competing hypotheses for analyst research: (1) the conflict of interest hy-
pothesis, which states that potential conflicts arising from investment banking business 
or trading incentives cause analysts to bias their recommendations, and (2) the superior 
information hypothesis, which states that investment bank analysts have an informational 
advantage compared to their independent counterparts. Despite the slightly obscure con-
sensus on the topic, majority of prior literature presented in Table 1 leans towards the 
conflict of interest hypothesis and therefore the second hypothesis of this study is stated 
as: 
 
H2: Independent analyst recommendations generate greater returns than 
brokerage analyst recommendations. 
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However, differences in the performance of different analyst types could also stem from 
differences in the characteristics of the covered companies. Greater information asymme-
tries are prone to induce greater market reactions to new pieces of information (e.g. Wom-
ack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001), in which case the value of analyst research is expected to 
be greater for stocks with greater informational asymmetries, which also contain more 
risk. Since the information available in the market about small stocks and stocks with low 
analyst coverage is relatively low compared to large and more popular stocks, firm size 
and coverage amount variables can proxy for information asymmetries (D’Mello & Fer-
ris, 2000; Doukas, Kim & Pantzalis, 2005). Consequently, the third hypothesis of this 
study is stated as: 
 
H3: Greater information asymmetry between investors and company man-
agement induces greater market reactions to recommendation revisions. 
 
Reputational effects are expected to control analyst conflicts of interests to some extent 
(Jackson, 2005; Ljunqvist et al., 2007), in essence, analysts refrain from reporting biased 
research to uphold their reputation. Even if an analyst refrains from reporting biased re-
search to prevent reputational losses, a conflict may still originate if information of the 
upcoming revision leaks (Irvine, Lipson & Puckett, 2007; Christophe, Ferri & Hsieh, 
2010). However, other alternative is that the market learns to expect and predict the on-
going research processes for several reasons: most analyst reports take place after public 
company disclosures (Soltes, 2014), analysts discuss with companies prior to the reports 
(Brown et al., 2015), companies actively engage with the analysts in an attempt to con-
vince analysts of the company prospects (Brown et al., 2018), and analysts sometimes 
publicly announce an upcoming report. Since leaking is a punishable offence and the fi-
nancial markets are heavily regulated, learning from the research process itself is consid-
ered to be more plausible. Private interactions are expected to enhance the learning by the 
market, and because brokerage firms have more ties to the companies they are covering, 
it is expected that the market learns to predict the research conducted by brokerage ana-
lysts to a greater extent. This concludes the fourth and final hypothesis of this study, 
which is stated as: 
 
H4: The market learns to predict on-going brokerage research processes to 
a greater extent than independent research processes. 
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3 RESEARCH DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
3.1 Data sample 
 
Target market for this study is the Finnish stock market which is chosen due to the pres-
ence of an accredited purely independent equity research company, as well as due to the 
scarcity of prior research into analyst recommendations in the Finnish market. Time pe-
riod for the study is chosen based on how long independent research has been provided 
in the Finnish market ranging from February 2010 to May 2018. The data sample consists 
of daily analyst recommendations and target prices. 
 
The daily analyst recommendations and target prices are collected from the Thomson 
Reuters’ I/B/E/S database. First, recommendation data has to be manually collected 
through Thomson Reuters Eikon software, which provides detailed historical data of 
those analysts that currently provide coverage on a specific company. Each data input 
contains the name of the analyst, name of the company, date, current recommendation, 
prior recommendation (if exists), target stock price (if issued) and current stock price. 
The data is provided in the software in a way that recommendations have to be collected 
separately for each company. Subsequently, these individual datasets are combined to 
form independent and brokerage datasets. Analyses on the data are conducted with Ox-
Metrics and SPSS Statistics software. 
 
Table 2 presents the number of recommendations and target prices in the sample. There 
are total of 24 research firms of which only one can be classified as purely independent. 
However, the difference in companies covered does not differ with the same magnitude. 
Moreover, the difference in the number of issued recommendations does not differ dras-
tically, which allows for the examination of the differences between the groups. Never-
theless, the results from this examination should not be extrapolated too far, since it is 
possible that the independent side results are actually caused by firm specific character-
istics rather being the effects of being independent research firm. Limitations of this study 
are further discussed in chapter 5.  
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Table 2. Sample recommendations and target prices 
 Research firm type  
 Independent Brokerage Total 
Research firms 1 23 24 
Analysts 11 88 99 
Companies covered 100 107 122 
Recommendations 1125 2313 3438 
Target prices 1108 2295 3403 
 
 
3.2 Research design 
 
This study contains three sets of analyses. First, differences in recommendation and target 
price averages between the analyst types are analyzed in a univariate analysis. Second, 
an event study approach is applied as initial announcement period returns to recommen-
dation revisions are examined on a daily basis as well as on different event periods. Third, 
recommendation returns are analyzed in long-term by applying a portfolio method with 
a buy-and-hold investment strategy. 
 
Differences in recommendations and target prices 
Differences in the issued recommendations and target prices between the two analyst 
groups are analyzed to investigate whether one side is significantly more optimistic than 
the other. Analysis is done by comparing the average recommendation (on a scale from 
1 to 5) and target price premiums (relative difference between the issued target price and 
the underlying stock price at the time of issuance) with a two-sample t-test. These anal-
yses provide evidence for H1. 
 
Announcement period returns 
To analyze the announcement period returns an event study method similar to Bradley, 
Jordan & Ritter (2003; 2008) is utilized5, where portfolio excess returns are cumulated 
over certain time periods to calculate cumulative market adjusted returns (“CMAR”), 
which are subsequently analyzed and compared between the different analyst types. The 
                                                 
5 For other studies applying similar method see, e.g., Agrawal and Chen (2008) or Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2008).  
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event study method was originally made popular by Ball and Brown (1968), who studied 
the information content of accounting numbers in annual reports, and their effect to the 
stock prices of the companies. These short-term return analyses are conducted to provide 
evidence for H2, H3. Furthermore, the daily average returns prior to recommendation 
revisions are analyzed to provide evidence for H4. 
 
Similar to Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2008), analyst recommendations are divided into 
four types: (1) coverage initiations, (2) reiterations, (3) upgrades and (4) downgrades6. In 
the first set of analyzes all recommendation types are included, however, in further ana-
lyzes of recommendation returns only upgrades and downgrades are included due to the 
small number of initiations and reiterations in the sample. Recommendations are also 
grouped by analyst type: (1) independent and (2) brokerage analysts. Cumulative market-
adjusted returns are calculated over four event periods surrounding the issuance of rec-
ommendation: 2-day, 5-day, 11-day and 21-day periods centered on the announcement 
date. Formula for calculating the CMAR over days t – n to t + m is adopted from Bradley, 
Jordan and Ritter (2008, p. 111) and it is stated as: 
 
 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑛, 𝑡 + 𝑚) = ∑
1
𝑁𝑡
𝑡+𝑚
𝑡=𝑡−𝑛
∑ (𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑚𝑡)
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1
 (1)  
 
where t = 0 is the recommendation date, Nt is the number of the sample returns on day t, 
rit is the return on stock i on day t and rmt is the market return on day t. To simplify, the 
average returns for each day surrounding the recommendation date are accumulated to 
calculate CMARs for (-10,+10), (-5,+5), (-2,+2) and (0,+2)-day periods. 
 
Differences between the average CMARs of the two analyst groups are analyzed by com-
paring the average returns with a two-sample t-test as well as with a cross-sectional re-
gression analysis. Furthermore, differences in daily returns surrounding the recommen-
dation revisions are analyzed by comparing the average daily returns and the distributions 
of the returns with a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and chi-squared test. 
                                                 
6 For the short-term analysis it is more informative to group the recommendations based on the revisions 
rather than grouping them by the level of the rating (e.g. Francis & Soffer, 1997) because, for example, an 
upgrade from strong sell to sell rating should be a slightly positive signal and if it was grouped with sell 
ratings the expectation would be that it is a negative signal. 
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Portfolio formation 
For the long-term returns’ analysis, a portfolio method similar to Barber, Lehavy & True-
man (2007) and Cliff (2007) is utilized. As described in previous section, the data sample 
is divided into two sets: (1) independent and (2) brokerage recommendations. The pur-
pose of the long-term analysis is to evaluate the investment value of analyst recommen-
dations from a retail investors’ perspective and compare which type of analysts provide 
more value to the investor. These analyses provide further evidence for H2 and H3. 
 
Independent and brokerage recommendation are further divided into two portfolios: 
“buy” and “hold-sell” (referred to simply as “sell”) portfolios7. Recommendations were 
first divided into three portfolios with hold recommendations as a standalone portfolio, 
however, a two-portfolio approach as in Barber, Lehavy & Trueman (2007) was later 
chosen due to independent recommendations containing very few hold recommendations. 
Furthermore, combining holds with sells is justifiable as majority of investment profes-
sionals (Boni & Womack, 2002) and investors (Francis & Soffer, 1997) actually interpret 
hold recommendation as a sell sign. 
 
When an analyst initiates or revises a recommendation for a stock the stock enters the 
respective portfolio with a one-euro weight at the close of trading on the day the recom-
mendation is issued. This way the initial return from the recommendation revision is ex-
cluded from the portfolio returns, because as argued by Cliff (2007) most private inves-
tors do not have access, or do not continuously follow, real-time recommendation up-
dates. Therefore, it is more likely that common investors will spot the recommendations 
with a delay and by that time professional and algorithmic traders have already taken 
advantage of the initial return. Conversely, when an analyst drops the coverage of a stock, 
or the recommendation is revised so that the stock enters the other portfolio, the stock 
will be removed from the respective portfolio at the close of trading. For example, when 
a sell recommendation is upgraded to buy recommendation the revision triggers a one-
euro investment to the stock in the buy portfolio and the stock is removed from the sell 
portfolio. Both trades are done at the close of trading on the announcement date. A stock 
can enter the same portfolio multiple times only if multiple analysts have recommended 
                                                 
7 I/B/E/S database divides recommendations into five rating categories: strong buy, buy, hold, sell and 
strong sell. In this study, the buy portfolio contains recommendations with strong buy or buy ratings and 
the sell portfolio recommendations of hold, sell or strong sell ratings. 
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the stock. A stock can also enter or exist in both portfolios at the same time due to the 
same reason. 
 
Casey (2013) finds that the choice to include reiterations of recommendations in the port-
folio approach can bias the investment bank portfolio performance since IB analysts gen-
erally issue more reiterations than independents. Therefore, recommendation reiterations 
are excluded from the portfolios. This means that a reiteration does not trigger a new 
investment in the portfolio and the original investment remains unmodified until the rec-
ommendation is upgraded or downgraded from the portfolio. 
 
The daily return of a portfolio is the weighted return of its components and thus the daily 
return of a portfolio on day t can be expressed as (adopted from Barber, Lehavy & True-
man, 2007): 
 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 =
∑  Xit
nt
i=1 Rit
∑  Xit
nt
i=1
 (2)  
 
where Rpt is the portfolio return on day t, n is the number of recommendations in the 
portfolio, Rit is the adjusted return
8 on stock i on day t and Xit is the weight of stock i in 
the portfolio on day t. Weight of stock i equals 1 on day t, when recommendation was 
issued on day t – 1 and after that the weight equals the compounded return on stock i from 
the close of trading on the day of the recommendation through day t – 1. 
 
Daily portfolio returns are compounded to monthly returns for further analysis. Whether 
recommendations have investment value is examined based on their ability to produce 
statistically significant abnormal returns in regression analysis. Cliff (2007) argues that 
past studies have had methodological problems concerning the risk models used to meas-
ure abnormal returns. To account for possible model misspecification, three different 
models are used to measure abnormal returns as in Cliff (2007): Capital Asset Pricing 
Model9, Fama and French’s (1993) 3-factor model and Carhart’s (1997) 4-factor model10. 
                                                 
8 Returns are adjusted and include dividends as they are expected to be reinvested.  
9 The model was developed in Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) and later presented in Sharpe (1970). 
10 The factors used in the two latter models are monthly European factors provided by Kenneth French 
(2018).  
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The risk-free rate used in the models is the one-month Euribor rate11 and the market port-
folio is the OMX Helsinki total return index (“OMXHGI”). Abnormal return is measured 
as the intercept from the estimations of the regression models. 
 
 
3.3 Methods 
 
Two-sample t-test 
A two-sample t-test is a common test for statistical significance between two averages. 
The null hypothesis of the test is that the averages do not statistically significantly differ 
from one another. The formula for the two-sample t-test is stated as: 
 
 
𝑡 =  
?̅?  −  ?̅?
√
𝑆𝑋
2
𝑛𝑋
+
𝑆𝑌
2
𝑛𝑌
 
(3)  
 
where ?̅? is the average of sample X, ?̅? is the average of sample Y, S is the sample standard 
deviation, and n is the sample size. 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
A two-sample KS-test is used to compare the CMAR and daily return distributions of the 
different analyst type samples. The KS-statistic quantifies the maximum distance between 
the two samples’ empirical distribution functions to determine whether these samples 
come from the same distribution. The null hypothesis of the test is that the two samples 
come from the same distribution, although the test does not state what that distribution is. 
Differences in the distributions are evidence of the market reacting differently to recom-
mendations by different analyst types. The formula for the empirical distribution func-
tions is stated as: 
 
 
𝐹𝑛(𝑥) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐼[−∞,𝑥](𝑋𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (4)  
                                                 
11 Monthly rate averages are retrieved from Bank of Finland (2018). 
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where I is the indicator function which is equal to 1 if Xi is less than or equal to x and zero 
otherwise. The KS-test statistic D is then calculated from the formula: 
 
 𝐷𝑛,𝑚 = 𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑥
|𝐹1,𝑛(𝑥) − 𝐹2,𝑚(𝑥)| (5)  
 
where F1,n and F2,m are empirical distribution functions of the first and second sample, 
and the test statistic D is the maximum absolute difference between the empirical distri-
bution functions as denoted by the supremum function. 
 
Chi-squared test 
A chi-squared test (“X2-test”) is a test of independence between two categorical variables. 
The test examines the association between two variables by determining whether the ex-
pected and observed frequencies of the variables have statistically significant differences. 
In this study, the chi-squared test is applied for a two-by-two classification, where the 
first variable is the analyst firm type (independent or brokerage) and the second variable 
is the daily distribution of market adjusted returns (positive or negative) prior to a recom-
mendation revision. The test is applied to investigate whether there exists any association 
between the analyst types and the distribution of daily returns to positive and negative 
prior to a recommendation revision. Positive (negative) returns prior to a recommendation 
upgrade (downgrade) proxy for possible leaking of information. The formula for the chi-
squared test is stated as: 
 
 
𝑋2 = ∑ ∑
(𝑂𝑖,𝑗 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑗)
2
𝐸𝑖,𝑗
𝑐
𝑗=1
𝑟
𝑖=1
 (6)  
 
where r is the number of rows, c is the number of columns, O is the observed frequency 
and E is the expected frequency. Expected frequency for the cells is the row total times 
the column total divided by the grand total. The null hypothesis for the test is that the 
variables are statistically independent while the alternative hypothesis states that some 
association exists. 
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Linear regression analysis and related tests 
The model used for the announcement period return cross-sectional regression analysis 
controls for firm size, low analyst coverage and absolute recommendation levels. Thus, 
the model used is stated as: 
 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑋1𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝑋2𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐵𝑈𝑌/𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐵𝑈𝑌/𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(7)  
 
where AR is the announcement period return, 𝛼 is the intercept, IND is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the analyst is independent and zero otherwise, SMALL (MEDIUM) is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm is small-cap (medium-cap) stock and zero 
otherwise, MAX1A (MAX2A) is a dummy variable that equals one if a maximum of one 
(two) analyst is covering the stock and zero otherwise, SBUY and BUY (SSELL and SELL) 
are dummy variables that equal one if the recommendation is upgraded (downgraded) to 
strong buy or buy (strong sell or sell) rating, and 𝜀 is the error term. 
 
In the time-series regression analysis of the long-term portfolio returns multiple risk mod-
els are employed. The first risk model used in this study is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (“CAPM”), which is a simple risk-return relation model used to calculate the re-
quired rates of returns for specified assets. The model takes into account the assets sensi-
tivity to the systematic risk of the market and argues that an asset’s required rate of return 
is dependent on how its risk compares to that of a market portfolio’s. The formula for the 
model is as follows: 
 
 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝜀𝑝𝑡 (8)  
 
where Rpt is the portfolio return for month t, Rft is the risk-free rate, 𝛼𝑝 is the estimated 
abnormal return, 𝛽𝑝 is the estimated market beta of the portfolio and Rmt is the return of 
the OMXHGI. Market beta essentially represents the systematic risk of the portfolio – 
any value above one indicates that the portfolio is riskier than the market and, vice versa, 
values below one indicate a less risky portfolio. The model is taught in almost all finance 
textbooks and it is widely used to estimate cost of equity capital and to measure abnormal 
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performance of portfolios, however, it has not received much recognition in empirical 
testing because of its poor ability to explain stock returns (see, e.g., Blume & Friend, 
1973), and since other factors in addition to the market factor have been found to affect 
the formulation of asset returns (Fama & French, 2004). Nevertheless, the model is in-
cluded in the study, but the results are interpreted with caution. 
 
Fama and French (1993) build on the CAPM model because US stock returns show only 
little relation to the market beta in CAPM empirical testing. They identify two new factors 
affecting the returns of common stocks: (1) Small Minus Big (“SMB”) factor, which is 
the average return of three small-stock portfolios minus the average return of three big-
stock portfolios, and (2) High Minus Low (“HML”) factor, which is the average return of 
two high book-to-market stock portfolios minus the average return of two low book-to-
market return portfolios. When we add these factors to the equation, the 3-factor model 
is stated as: 
 
 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑝𝑡 (9)  
 
where a positive coefficient for the SMB factor (sp) indicates a tilt towards small-stocks 
in the portfolio and negative coefficient towards big-stocks, and a positive loading on 
HML (hp) represents a tilt towards value stocks (high book-to-market) and negative load-
ing towards growth stocks (low book-to-market) in the portfolio. 
 
The last model used is the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model which introduces one more 
factor to the equation. It extends the model by controlling for stock return momentum. 
Adding the momentum factor the equation is stated as: 
 
 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑚𝑝𝑀𝑂𝑀
+ 𝜀𝑝𝑡 
(10)  
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where MOM12 is the monthly return premium on 12-month winner stocks minus 12-
month loser stocks. (Carhart, 1997.) Positive loading on the momentum factor (mp) indi-
cates that the portfolio consists mainly of past winner stocks and negative loading that it 
consists of past loser stocks. 
 
A set of tests are conducted to ensure reliable interpretation of the regression results. 
Jargue and Bera (1987) test (“JB-test”) is utilized to test the goodness-of-fit of the sample 
and regression residual normal distributions. The test examines whether the sample skew-
ness and kurtosis follow a normal distribution. The formula for the test statistic is stated 
as: 
 
 𝐽𝐵 =  
𝑛 − 𝑘 + 1
6
∗ (𝑆2 +
1
4
(𝐶 − 3)2) (11)  
 
where n is the number of observations, S is the sample skewness, C is the sample kurtosis 
and k is the number of independent variables. Null hypothesis of the test is that both 
skewness and excess kurtosis are zero, which means that the sample distribution matches 
a normal distribution.  
 
Results from the sample normal distribution JB-tests are reported in Appendix 2. For the 
announcement period returns the null hypotheses are rejected for each sample (p-values 
0,000) and for the portfolio returns it is rejected for the independent sell portfolio (p-value 
0,05). However, even though the null hypothesis of the JB-test is rejected for some of the 
samples, the central limit theorem states that a sample distribution approximates to a nor-
mal distribution as the sample size increases. Usual threshold value for the theorem is a 
sample size greater than 30 (Holopainen & Pulkkinen, 2015). Therefore, approximate 
normality distributions are assumed for samples that do not pass the JB test because of 
large sample sizes. 
 
White’s (1980) test is used to test if the variance of the regression residual is constant. 
The test applies an auxiliary regression where it regresses the squared residuals from the 
original regression onto the original regressors, squared original regressors and their 
                                                 
12 Other acronyms for the factor include “UMD” and “WML” (see, e.g., Cliff, 2007; Barber, Lehavy & 
Trueman, 2007). 
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cross-products. The null hypothesis of the test is that the residual is homoscedastic (has a 
constant variance). However, if the null hypothesis is rejected, the heteroskedasticity can 
be taken into account by using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Consistently, 
the null hypothesis in the White’s test is rejected for one regression model, the independ-
ent sell portfolio regression, and therefore heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors 
are calculated for this model. 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test (Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978) is used to test for the presence of 
serial correlation (autocorrelation) in the residual, which would cause incorrect conclu-
sions from other tests and sub-optimal estimates of regression model parameters, if not 
taken into account. Null hypothesis of the test is that no autocorrelation exists. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, autocorrelation of the residual can be taken into account by using 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors in the calculation of the regressor t statistics. 
However, no autocorrelation is detected as the null hypothesis holds for all of the regres-
sion models in this study. 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample recommendations and target price 
premiums divided into two groups based on analyst firm characteristics. Recommenda-
tion values range from 1 to 513, whereas target price premium is the relative difference 
between the issued target price and the underlying stock price on the date of the announce-
ment. Average values indicate that brokerage analysts tend to be more optimistic in issu-
ing both recommendations and target price premiums. The effect is greater for target price 
premium (10.2 % compared to 6.3 %), whereas the difference between average recom-
mendation is not economically as large (2.65 compared to 2.87). Looking at the recom-
mendation distribution in Panel B, a major difference is identified as the independent side 
almost never issue hold ratings, whereas it is the most common rating for the brokerage 
analysts. Moreover, the distribution shows that for independent optimistic recommenda-
tions form 54 % of all ratings compared to 47 % by brokerage firms. However, brokerage 
firms issue relatively less sell and strong sell ratings which causes their average recom-
mendation to be more optimistic. 
 
Table 3. Recommendation and target price premium descriptive statistics 
 Independent Brokerage 
 Ratings Premiums Ratings Premiums 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
n 1125 1105 2313 2295 
Average 2.87 6.3 % 2.65 10.2 % 
Min 1 -58.0 % 1 -61.1 % 
1st Quartile 2 -1.2 % 2 -0.6 % 
Median 2 5.6 % 3 8.1 % 
3rd Quartile 4 11.8 % 3 16.1 % 
Max 5 237.2 % 5 371.3 % 
Std. Dev. 1.276 0.169 1.062 0.224 
     
                                                 
13 Recommendation scale: 1 = strong buy, 2 = buy, 3 = hold, 4 = sell and 5 = strong sell. 
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Table 3 (continued)     
Panel B: Recommendation distribution 
 Independent Brokerage 
 n % n % 
Strong buy 148 13 % 339 15 % 
Buy 457 41 % 738 32 % 
Hold 13 1 % 744 32 % 
Sell 409 36 % 388 17 % 
Strong sell 98 9 % 104 4 % 
 
Table 4 reports the monthly descriptive statistics for the different portfolios’ returns and 
the four regressors. Return statistics are reported both as raw and market-adjusted. Aver-
age monthly return for the independent buy portfolio is 1.5 % (0.7 % market-adjusted), 
whereas it is 1.1 % (0.2 %) for the brokerage portfolio. Not controlling for risk, the raw 
return generated by following independent buy recommendations clearly outperforms the 
brokerage buy recommendations. Moreover, the average monthly returns for the sell port-
folios are 0.5 % (-0.4 %) and 0.8 % (-0.1 %), respectively. Similar pattern is visible in the 
sell portfolio returns as the independent portfolio underperforms the brokerage portfolio, 
indicating that independent are also more accurate at picking loser stocks. Furthermore, 
it is useful to note that even though both portfolios generate negative market-adjusted 
returns, the raw returns for both sell portfolios are positive, indicating that short selling 
pessimistic analyst recommendations is not profitable. In addition, the maximum monthly 
returns for both independent and brokerage sell portfolios are actually higher than the 
maximum returns for the buy portfolios. 
 
Moving on to the regressor descriptive statistics, the positive average monthly return for 
the SMB factor indicates that small stocks have outperformed big stocks during the ex-
amination period. On the other hand, the negative return for the HML factor indicates that 
low book-to-market stocks have outperformed more expensive stocks. Furthermore, the 
positive return for the MOM factor denotes the superior performance of stocks that have 
had good momentum 12 months prior. 
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4.2 Recommendation and target price premium averages 
 
Table 5 reports the averages for recommendations and target price premiums divided by 
recommendation type. Average recommendation differences are analyzed in Panel A us-
ing two-sample t-test. Looking at the full sample results, the average recommendation by 
independent (2.87) is more pessimistic than that of brokerage (2.65). The difference is 
also statistically significant (p-value 0.000). Same applies for coverage initiations where 
the average recommendation by independents is significantly (p-value 0.044) more pes-
simistic. Similarly, average independent ratings for reiterations and upgrades are slightly 
more pessimistic, however, these differences are not statistically significant. For down-
grades the result is the same and the difference is significant (p-value 0.000). Collectively 
the results indicate that brokerage analysts issue relatively more optimistic recommenda-
tions, and that the difference is most pronounced for recommendation downgrades, hence 
providing support to H1. 
 
Table 5. Univariate results for differences in recommendations and target prices 
This table reports the recommendation and target price premium averages divided into four groups based 
on recommendation type: coverage initiations, reiterations, upgrades and downgrades. Full sample results 
for both research firm categories are also reported. N is the number of observations. Panel A reports the 
recommendation averages and Panel B the target price premiums averages. The null hypothesis of the dif-
ference t-tests is that the averages are equal. 
Panel A: Recommendations 
Recommendation  
type 
Independent Brokerage 
Difference  
p-value 
Full sample 2.87 2.65 0.000 
n 1125 2313  
Initiations 2.79 2.45 0.044 
n 101 122  
Reiterations 3.00 2.67 0.388 
n 11 187  
Upgrades 2.08 2.03 0.309 
n 507 1016  
Downgrades 3.67 3.30 0.000 
n 506 988  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
53 
Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Target price premiums 
Recommendation  
type 
Independent Brokerage 
Difference  
p-value 
Full sample 5.9 % 10.2 % 0.000 
n 1108 2295  
Initiations 8.0 % 11.4 % 0.498 
n 89 111  
Reiterations 9.8 % 17.0 % 0.355 
n 11 186  
Upgrades 8.7 % 14.4 % 0.000 
n 505 1014  
Downgrades 2.7 % 4.4 % 0.080 
n 503 984  
Bolded values indicate significance at least at the 0.10 level.  
 
Panel B shows the results for the differences in the average target price premiums. In the 
full sample, brokerage analysts on average issue target prices with a premium of 10.2 % 
compared to 5.9 % by independent analysts. The difference is both economically and 
statistically significant (p-value 0.000). Differences exist also for initiations and reitera-
tions, although they are not statistically significant. Conversely, for recommendation up-
grades the magnitude of the difference is large (8.7 % compared to 14.4 %) and significant 
(p-value 0.000). Furthermore, difference for downgrades is smaller in magnitude and only 
weakly significant (p-value 0.080), and therefore not so strong evidence. In sum, the ev-
idence from target price premiums indicates that brokerage analysts are more optimistic 
than independent analysts. Therefore, the analysis of target prices provides support to H1. 
 
In addition to average premiums, the percentage of achieved target prices is also calcu-
lated. In the sample, approximately 46 % (39 %) of independent (brokerage) target prices 
are achieved within the subsequent 12-month period, which further strengthens the evi-
dence of brokerage analysts’ relatively higher optimism. 
 
The univariate analysis of recommendations and target price premiums comprises of three 
key findings. First, consistent with prior research (e.g. Lin & McNichols, 1998; Carleton, 
Chen & Steiner, 1998; Agrawal & Chen, 2008) brokerage analyst recommendations are 
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on average more optimistic than those of independent. Moreover, the effect is most pro-
nounced for recommendation downgrades. Second, similar pattern exists for target price 
premiums, although with the exception of the effect being most pronounced for recom-
mendation upgrades. This is in contrast to Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006), who find 
that investment banks issue more pessimistic price targets. Third, of all issued target 
prices, 46 % of independent and 39 % of brokerage analysts’ target prices are met within 
the subsequent 12-month period. Both values are slightly worse than the 54 % Asquith, 
Mikhail and Au (2005) find in their full analyst sample. In sum, the evidence indicates 
that potentially conflicted brokerage analysts are more reluctant to issue strong pessimis-
tic recommendations and instead opt for more neutral downgrades and, in addition, issue 
more optimistic target prices for upgraded stocks. Collectively these findings primarily 
provide support H1 (“Brokerage analysts issue more optimistic recommendations and 
target prices than independent analysts”). 
 
 
4.3 Announcement period returns 
 
Univariate analysis 
Table 6 reports the cumulative market-adjusted announcement period returns associated 
with revisions of analyst recommendations. Returns are calculated over four different 
event periods: 3-day, 5-day, 11-day and 21-day windows centered on the announcement 
date. Moreover, returns are divided into different recommendation types. However, initi-
ations and reiterations are omitted from further analyzes due to the small number of these 
recommendations. Differences in return averages and sample distributions are analyzed 
with two-sample t-test and KS-test, respectively. Full sample results show that, apart from 
the 3-day window, independent analysts induce more positive market reactions, indicat-
ing that the market discounts potentially conflicted brokerage analysts’ opinions. How-
ever, none of the differences in the averages or distributions are statistically significant 
(p-values > 0.10). Similar pattern exists in recommendation type sub-samples: the market 
reaction is greater for independent recommendations compared to brokerage, although 
none of these differences are significant with the exception of the difference in average 
return for the 11-day window around recommendation upgrades (p-value 0.026). Collec-
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tively, the evidence implies that there are no significant differences between the an-
nouncement period returns for any of the recommendation types. The finding suggests 
that the market’s reaction to analyst recommendations is on average the same for recom-
mendations by any analyst type, in essence, the market does not discount for potential 
conflicts nor does it believe that some analysts have superior information. These results 
do not provide support to H2 (“Independent analyst recommendations generate greater 
returns than brokerage analyst recommendations”). 
 
Table 6. Univariate results for differences in cumulative market adjusted returns 
This table reports the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) for four different time periods. Day 0 
is the date when the recommendation is issued and days -10, -5, -2, +2, +5 and +10 are days relative to the 
issuance date. CMARs are reported for the full sample as well as for two sub-samples based on whether 
the recommendation is an upgrade or downgrade. Difference p-values represent the significance of the 
difference between the average CMARs from two-sample t-test. The null hypothesis of the difference t-test 
is that the averages are equal. KS p-value represents the significance of the difference between the distri-
butions of the samples from the two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The null hypothesis of the KS-test 
is that the samples come from the same distribution. 
Recommendation  
type 
Event 
period 
Independent Brokerage 
Diff.  
p-value 
KS 
p-value 
Full sample (0,+2) 0.02 % 0.14 % 0.448 0.076 
 (-2,+2) 0.23 % 0.06 % 0.482 0.827 
 (-5,+5) 0.40 % 0.11 % 0.306 0.814 
 (-10,+10) 0.36 % -0.03 % 0.285 0.230 
      
Upgrades (0,+2) 1.40 % 1.40 % 0.984 0.110 
 (-2,+2) 2.14 % 1.59 % 0.115 0.517 
 (-5,+5) 2.43 % 1.50 % 0.026 0.298 
 (-10,+10) 1.69 % 0.98 % 0.200 0.235 
      
Downgrades (0,+2) -1.44 % -1.20 % 0.291 0.342 
 (-2,+2) -1.82 % -1.62 % 0.559 0.694 
 (-5,+5) -1.68 % -1.35 % 0.437 0.870 
  (-10,+10) -1.12 % -1.00 % 0.816 0.776 
Bolded values indicate significance at least at the 0.10 level.   
 
Figure 3 illustrates the 21-day window returns for recommendation upgrades and down-
grades centered on the announcement of recommendations. Even though the analysis in 
Table 6 shows that the differences between the analyst types are not statistically signifi-
cant, it is useful to examine the day-by-day formation of the cumulative returns. First, 
starting from day -10 relative to the announcement of recommendation revision, it is 
shown that the stock returns prior to the revision drift to the opposite direction, in essence, 
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prior to upgrades the stock price drifts downwards and vice versa prior to downgrades. 
This is consistent with the notion that analysts follow the price levels of stocks to identify 
stocks that are currently underperforming (outperforming) but are believed to outperform 
(underperform) in the future, in other words, to identify future winners and losers. More 
interestingly, the figure shows that the drift actually reverses one day before (5 days be-
fore for independent upgrades) the actual announcement of the recommendation revision. 
This finding indicates that the market could learn of the on-going research process in 
advance and begin to predict its outcome. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative market adjusted returns for 21-day window 
 
Second, analysis of the announcement day 0 and the following days shows that the stock 
price reaction is most pronounced on the day of the announcement, as would be expected. 
The drift continues for one more day after the announcement after which it begins to fade. 
The fading takes longer for downgrades, whereas for upgrades the cumulative abnormal 
returns after day +1 are almost nonexistent. The finding is consistent with Altınkılıç. Han-
sen & Ye (2016), who argue that the post-revision drift is no longer significant due to 
high-frequency algorithmic trading, and that better availability of data in today’s super-
computer era diminishes the informational role of analysts. 
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The daily accumulation of CMARs is further analyzed in Table 7, which reports the av-
erage daily market-adjusted returns (“MAR”) from day -10 to the announcement day 0. 
First, looking at the average MARs in Panel A, the analysis shows that prior to recom-
mendation upgrades independent (brokerage) MARs are negative until day -6 (-5) after 
which the MARs shift positive. Difference in the averages is significant on day -2 (p-
value 0.030) and weakly significant on day -5 (0.075). Difference in the distributions is 
significant on day -6 (0.018), as well as weakly significant on days -3 and -2 (p-values 
0.069 and 0.054, respectively). Moreover, the chi-squared test is significant on day -2 
(0.035), suggesting that relatively greater amount of positive returns is associated with 
independent recommendations on this day. In sum, the analysis of upgrades suggests that 
the market could learn of the research processes as average MARs turn positive just be-
fore the revision. The evidence is stronger for independent and slightly more ambiguous 
for brokerage analysts. Evidence of the differences is not consistent as only day -2 returns 
evidence significant differences in all difference tests. 
 
Table 7. Daily market-adjusted returns surrounding recommendation revisions 
This table reports the average daily market-adjusted returns prior to the announcement of recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades. Daily returns are reported from day -10 through day 0 relative to the announce-
ment date. t-tests are conducted both as one-sample and two sample tests. The null hypothesis in the one-
sample test (column ‘t-stat’) is that the daily average MAR equals zero. The null hypothesis in the differ-
ence t-test is that the independent and brokerage average MARs are equal. KS p-value represents the sig-
nificance of the difference between the distributions of the independent and brokerage returns from the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The null hypothesis of the KS-test is that the samples come from the same 
distribution. The X2-test is applied to investigate whether there exists any association between the analyst 
types and the distribution of daily market reactions (positive or negative) prior to the recommendation 
revision. The null hypothesis of the X2-test is that no association exists between the analyst types and the 
distribution of positive and negative returns on the inspection day. 
Panel A: Upgrades 
Day Independent t-stat  Brokerage t-stat   
Diff. 
p-value 
KS  
p-value 
X2  
p-value 
-10 -0.09 % (-0.97)  -0.11 % (-2.09) **  0.832 0.120 0.683 
-9 -0.14 % (-1.58)  -0.08 % (-1.81) *  0.529 0.128 0.890 
-8 -0.18 % (-2.18) ** -0.11 % (-2.14) **  0.470 0.253 0.879 
-7 -0.20 % (-2.00) ** -0.08 % (-1.68) *  0.303 0.267 0.529 
-6 -0.18 % (-2.02) ** -0.06 % (-0.99)   0.254 0.018 0.833 
-5 0.02 % (0.26)  -0.17 % (-3.24) ***  0.075 0.392 0.949 
-4 0.17 % (1.71) * 0.01 % (0.15)   0.174 0.165 0.609 
-3 0.09 % (0.88)  0.06 % (1.07)   0.817 0.069 0.717 
-2 0.28 % (2.50) ** -0.02 % (-0.26)   0.030 0.054 0.035 
-1 0.46 % (2.81) *** 0.21 % (1.66) *  0.223 0.209 0.969 
0 1.05 % (7.24) *** 1.03 % (12.16) ***  0.883 0.001 0.000 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Panel B: Downgrades 
Day Independent t-stat  Brokerage t-stat   
Diff. 
p-value 
KS  
p-value 
X2  
p-value 
-10 0.14 % (1.65) * 0.10 % (2.00) **  0.722 0.873 0.457 
-9 0.21 % (2.40) ** 0.13 % (2.51) **  0.458 0.700 0.212 
-8 0.18 % (1.99) ** 0.15 % (2.55) **  0.782 0.564 0.635 
-7 0.07 % (0.78)  0.09 % (1.53)   0.837 0.918 0.581 
-6 0.02 % (0.25)  0.01 % (0.15)   0.895 0.482 0.836 
-5 0.41 % (4.21) *** 0.11 % (1.76) *  0.012 0.009 0.201 
-4 0.12 % (1.15)  0.01 % (0.21)   0.379 0.277 0.655 
-3 0.02 % (0.24)  0.20 % (3.38) ***  0.133 0.105 0.772 
-2 0.03 % (0.24)  -0.01 % (-0.14)   0.781 0.710 0.435 
-1 -0.41 % (-2.44) ** -0.41 % (-2.91) ***  0.992 0.218 0.168 
0 -0.76 % (-5.22) *** -0.84 % (-11.97) ***  0.640 0.038 0.018 
In one-sample tests statistical significance levels indicated with: * <0.10, ** <0.05 and *** <0.01. 
In difference tests bolded values indicate significance at least at the 0.10 level. 
 
Moving over to Panel B, the results for independent and brokerage analysts are similar. 
The MARs are positive prior to the revision and turn negative one day before the down-
grade. The negative returns on day -1 are statistically significant, as well as subsequent 
day returns. Furthermore, differences before the announcement are only significant on 
day -5 (p-value 0.012 for difference in the averages and 0.009 for difference in the distri-
butions), which indicates that there are no consistent differences between the analyst 
types. In sum, the results from the downgrades sub-sample evidence that the market could 
learn of the research processes. Moreover, no differences are identified between the ana-
lyst types. 
 
Collectively the analysis in Table 7 suggests that prior to a recommendation upgrade or 
downgrade the market appears to anticipate the revision, which suggests that the market 
learns of the on-going research processes and begins to predict their outcomes. Further-
more, the anticipation to independent revisions appears to be greater, however, differ-
ences between independent and brokerage analysts are primarily insignificant, suggesting 
that the effect of anticipation by the market is the same for both. Since no reliable differ-
ences are identified, and because the learning appears to be greater for independent re-
search processes, the evidence does not provide support to H4 (“The market learns to 
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predict on-going brokerage research processes to a greater extent than independent re-
search processes”). 
 
However, two important limitations must be considered in interpreting these findings. 
First, the evidence of market learning could actually be evidence of self-selection bias, 
meaning that analysts often tend to upgrade (downgrade) recommendations only after 
some good (bad) news are reported about the company, in which case the good (bad) 
news itself would have caused the drift to turn positive (negative) just before a recom-
mendation revision. For example, Soltes (2014) finds that 70 % of analyst reports are 
released immediately after a public company press release. The analysis presented does 
not control for these possible effects. Second, the findings assume that the recommenda-
tion revisions in the database are recorded on the correct dates, which cannot be con-
firmed. 
 
Cross-sectional regressions 
To further analyze the announcement period returns, a cross-sectional regression analysis 
is utilized. Results are presented in Table 8. These tests are conducted to build on the 
evidence from the univariate analysis in Table 6. Two different dependent variables are 
used: the 3-day and 5-day CMARs. The 11-day and 21-day CMARs are not included in 
this analysis due to the market reaction being most pronounced on the immediate days 
around the revision. In unreported tests it is found that the results from these regressions 
do not differ from those reported in Table 8. The regressions control for target company 
size (SMALL and MEDIUM variables), low analyst coverage amount (MAX1A and 
MAX2A) and absolute recommendation levels (SBUY, BUY, SSELL and SELL). More de-
tailed variable descriptions are included in Table 8. Moreover, correlation matrix for the 
regressors is presented in Appendix 3. None of the correlations exceed the threshold of 
80 % (see, e.g., Gujarati & Porter, 2009) and therefore it can be assumed that no multi-
collinearity exists between the variables. 
 
First looking at the regressions of upgrades sub-sample, the coefficient for the IND 
dummy is negative (positive) in regression 1 (2), however, the coefficients are not statis-
tically significant, indicating that the market reaction is the same for both type of analysts. 
Consistent with the analysis in Table 6, no significant differences are identified for market 
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reactions to different type of analysts’ upgrades. This finding does not provide support to 
H2. 
 
Moreover, the company size coefficients are negative and positive in regression 1 and 
both negative in regression 2, but they are not statistically significant. Thus, for recom-
mendation upgrades, there is no significant difference in announcement period returns for 
different size of companies. However, MAX1A coefficients are statistically significant (p-
values <0.05) and positive in regressions 1 and 2, which indicates that companies with 
only one analyst covering them earn significantly higher announcement period returns 
than companies covered by more than one analyst. Moreover, the coefficients on MAX2A 
in both regressions indicate that increasing the number of analysts from one to two has a 
detrimental effect on the announcement period return, however, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. In addition, SBUY and BUY variables show that the level of the 
recommendation is informative to the markets as indicated by the significant positive 
coefficients in regressions 1 and 2. 
 
Moving over to the recommendation downgrades sub-sample, the IND coefficient is pos-
itive in both regressions 3 and 4, evidencing that the market reaction to independent 
downgrades is less pronounced than to brokerage downgrades. The effect is weakly sig-
nificant (p-value 0.090) in regression 4. This evidence is in contrast to the evidence on 
upgrades and to the analysis on Table 6, where no differences in announcement period 
returns for different analyst types are identified. The finding that the market reaction to 
independent revisions is lesser is against H2, however, it is not statistically significant. 
 
Furthermore, SMALL and MEDIUM variable coefficients are all negative and significant 
at the 0.01 level in both regressions 3 and 4. These variables evidence that the market 
reaction to analyst downgrades is more pronounced for small and medium sized stocks, 
and that the effect is both economically and statistically significant. Analyst coverage 
variables MAX1A and MAX2A indicate similar findings as in the upgrades sub-sample 
that the informational value of recommendation revision is more pronounced when only 
one analyst is covering the stock, however, the coefficients are primarily insignificant. 
Recommendation level variables SSELL and SELL are negative and significant in both 
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regressions 3 and 4. The results are consistent with the buy sub-sample as recommenda-
tion levels are documented to contain value. Collectively, the firm size and coverage 
amount variables provide support to H3. 
 
Table 8. Multivariate analysis of announcement period returns 
This table reports the results of cross-sectional regressions of the announcement period returns. The de-
pendent variable in regressions (1) and (3) is the 3-day cumulative market-adjusted return from day 0 to 
+2, and in regressions (2) and (4) the 5-day cumulative market-adjusted return from day -2 to +2. Regres-
sions are run separately for upgrades and downgrades sub-samples. IND is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the analyst is independent, and zero otherwise. SMALL and MEDIUM are dummy variables that equal 
one if the target company is a Small Cap or Medium Cap stock, respectively, and zero otherwise. MAX1A 
and MAX2A are dummy variables that equal one if there is a maximum of one or two analysts covering the 
stock, respectively, and zero otherwise. SBUY, BUY, SSELL and SELL are dummy variables that equal one 
if the recommendation issued is a strong buy, buy, strong sell or sell rating, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
The p-values for the coefficients are presented in parentheses. The null hypothesis for these tests is a coef-
ficient of zero. 
 Upgrades  Downgrades  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dep. Variable (0,+2)  (-2,+2)  (0,+2)  (-2,+2)  
 Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  
Intercept 0.009 *** 0.012 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.006)  
IND -0.001  0.004  0.004  0.007 * 
 (0.655)  (0.332)  (0.114)  (0.090)  
SMALL -0.006  -0.011  -0.020 *** -0.025 *** 
 (0.188)  (0.127)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
MEDIUM 0.001  -0.002  -0.012 *** -0.018 *** 
 (0.764)  (0.730)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
MAX1A 0.011 ** 0.017 ** -0.006  -0.007  
 (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.129)  (0.290)  
MAX2A 0.001  0.005  0.007 ** 0.008  
 (0.808)  (0.410)  (0.039)  (0.129)  
SBUY 0.009 *** 0.006      
 (0.003)  (0.243)      
BUY 0.005 * 0.005      
 (0.069)  (0.245)      
SSELL     -0.008 ** -0.012 ** 
     (0.013)  (0.026)  
SELL     -0.004 * -0.008 ** 
     (0.068)  (0.023)  
Model summary        
n 1516  1516  1488  1488  
p-value 0.019 ** 0.071 * 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Adj.R2 0.0064  0.0040  0.0288  0.0192  
Statistical significance levels indicated with: * <0.10. ** <0.05 and *** 0.01.  
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Cross-sectional regressions provide two key findings. First, even though brokerage ana-
lysts were shown to issue more optimistic recommendations, the market reactions to rec-
ommendation revisions do not contain statistically significant differences between differ-
ent type of analysts, meaning that the market equally values the initial information content 
of independent and brokerage analyst recommendations. This is consistent with the find-
ings of Lin and McNichols (1998) and Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003), but in contrast 
to Michaely and Womack (1998) and Agrawal and Chen (2008), who find that the market 
discounts potentially conflicted analysts’ views, or to Casey (2013), who finds the oppo-
site that independent analysts generate smaller announcement period returns. Similar to 
Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003), the evidence supports neither the conflict of interest 
nor the superior information hypothesis, since the market values analyst recommenda-
tions equally. 
 
Second, control variables for target company size, amount of analyst coverage, and rec-
ommendation levels provides further insight into analyst recommendation characteristics. 
Size of the target company does not have a significant effect on announcement period 
returns for upgrades, however, it does have a significant negative effect for downgrades, 
indicating that the market reaction to recommendation downgrades for small stocks is 
greater than for large stocks. This is consistent with, Womack (1996) and Barber et al. 
(2001), who find that analyst research is more informative for small stocks, since there is 
less information available in the market about these stocks. Low analyst coverage is also 
found to be associated with greater market reaction to both upgrades and downgrades. 
Stocks with only one analyst covering them have greater market reactions to recommen-
dation revisions. Furthermore, increasing the number of analysts from one to two has a 
detrimental effect on the returns. This is consistent with Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis 
(2005) who show that stocks with low analyst coverage have greater informational asym-
metries, which indicates that analyst research is more beneficial for these stocks. It is also 
consistent with Li and You (2015) who show that increasing investor recognition of a 
stock is associated with greater market reactions. In addition to recommendation revisions 
the recommendation levels itself are also found to be informative, which is consistent 
with Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2010). 
 
In conclusion, the analysis of announcement period returns suggests that no differences 
exist in the initial market reactions to recommendation revisions between independent 
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and brokerage analysts, which does not provide support to H2 (“Independent analyst rec-
ommendations generate greater returns than brokerage analyst recommendations”). 
However, the evidence from the control variables for firm size and coverage amount 
(SMALL, MEDIUM, MAX1A and MAX2A), which proxy for greater information asym-
metries, provide support to H3 (“Greater information asymmetry between investors and 
company management induces greater market reactions to recommendation revisions”). 
 
 
4.4 Portfolio performances 
 
Table 9 reports the annual returns for each portfolio and the market index from 1st of 
February 2010 through 31st of May 2018 and the closing values of each portfolio indexed 
on 1st of February 2010. In addition, illustrative presentation of the indices is provided in 
Figure 4. Raw returns present the portfolio performances without controlling for risk or 
transaction costs. Performance of the independent buy portfolio clearly outperforms the 
brokerage buy portfolio and the market index by almost doubling the performance of the 
market. Brokerage buy portfolio also beats the market, but the difference is much smaller. 
Both sell portfolios underperform the market index, but again the difference to the market 
is greater for the independent portfolio. Not controlling for risk or transaction costs, the 
evidence indicates that analysts on average are able to identify both future winner and 
loser stocks, however, independent analysts significantly outperform brokerage analysts. 
 
Furthermore, examining the yearly returns for brokerage portfolios shows that the sell 
portfolio actually outperformed the buy portfolio in four out of the eight years, whereas 
the independent sell portfolio outperformed independent buy portfolio only in 2010. 
Moreover, even though brokerage sell portfolio underperformed the market, the differ-
ence is marginal as Figure 4 illustrates. For both independent and brokerage the difference 
to the market index is more pronounced for buy portfolios, which indicates that analysts 
on average are better at identifying future winner stocks than loser stocks. However, the 
time examination period from 2010 through 2018 has been a continuous bull market for 
the Finnish stock market, which is the most likely explanation for the differences between 
buy and sell portfolios. Although, it is notable that utilizing a short selling strategy for 
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analysts’ pessimistic views would have been unprofitable as the sell portfolios’ absolute 
performance is positive.  
 
Table 9. Yearly portfolio and market returns and index closing values 
This table reports the returns for the different portfolios and the OMXHGI index. The returns are yearly, 
except for years 2010 and 2018 where the returns are 11-month and 5-month returns, respectively. In addi-
tion, the index closing values of the portfolios and the market index on 31st of May 2018 are also reported. 
  
Independent Brokerage Index 
Year Buy Sell Buy Sell OMXHGI 
2018 5.2 % 0.3 % 4.1 % 9.5 % 10.9 % 
2017 21.8 % 4.4 % 11.7 % 10.5 % 10.7 % 
2016 29.2 % 12.2 % 19.1 % 23.6 % 8.5 % 
2015 42.9 % 14.8 % 23.2 % 11.6 % 14.9 % 
2014 13.5 % -0.9 % 6.7 % 6.9 % 10.7 % 
2013 39.2 % 26.4 % 33.9 % 31.3 % 32.2 % 
2012 12.4 % 11.3 % 16.9 % 13.6 % 14.1 % 
2011 -20.0 % -36.6 % -26.9 % -26.3 % -27.0 % 
2010 25.8 % 26.2 % 27.3 % 5.9 % 18.9 % 
Index closing 422.6 150.5 265.1 207.7 218.3 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Portfolio performance indices  
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Table 10 reports the results of the time-series regressions of the monthly portfolio returns 
from February 2010 through May 2018. To control for possible model misspecification 
as in Cliff (2007), three different risk models are used: the CAPM, 3-factor model and 4-
factor model. Correlation matrix for the regressors is presented in Appendix 4. None of 
the correlations exceed the threshold of 80 % and therefore it can be assumed that no 
multicollinearity exists. 
 
First, analyzing the independent results shows that the buy portfolio has generated abnor-
mal returns as measured by the alphas in the regressions. The annualized returns are 
roughly 9 % in the CAPM and 3-factor models and 10 % in the 4-factor model. These 
abnormal returns are significant at the 0.01 level in all three regressions. Moreover, the 
significant (0.01 level) positive loading on the SMB factor indicates that independent an-
alysts tend to favor smaller stocks. As for the HML factor the loading is not reliably dif-
ferent from zero, indicating no tilt towards growth nor value stocks. Moreover, the sig-
nificant (0.05 level) negative loading on the MOM factor indicates that most of the stocks 
in the portfolio tend to be past losers. Moving on to the independent sell portfolio, the 
alphas appear to be slightly negative, however, they are only weakly significant (0.10 
level) in the FF and 4-factor models. The annualized abnormal return for the sell portfolio 
is approximately -5 %. Similar to the buy portfolio, the sell portfolio is also tilted towards 
small stocks as captured by the significant positive loading on the SMB factor. In addition, 
the portfolio loads positively at the 0.05 level on the HML factor, indicating a tilt towards 
value stocks. Moreover, the loading on the MOM factor is not reliably different from zero. 
 
Second, looking at the brokerage portfolios the message is straightforward as all the al-
phas are insignificantly different from zero, indicating that neither portfolio is able to 
generate abnormal returns. Moreover, the SMB factor is significant and positive for the 
buy portfolio, indicating a tilt towards small stocks similar to the independent portfolios. 
Rest of the factors are not reliably different from zero, or one in the case of the market 
factor. Taken together the brokerage portfolio results indicate that the returns are mostly 
explained by the market return and that no positive or negative abnormal returns are gen-
erated.  
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Table 10. Portfolio performance regression results 
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the four portfolios. The portfolio returns are 
monthly from February 2010 through May 2018. Regressions use portfolio returns in excess of the one-
month risk-free rate, which is the one-month Euribor rate. The three models used are the CAPM, Fama-
French (1993) 3-factor and Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. Excess return is the average portfolio return in 
excess of the one-month risk-free rate. Alpha coefficients are the estimates of the portfolio abnormal returns 
from the CAPM, 3-factor model (Rm–Rf, SMB and HML) and 4-factor model (adding MOM). The p-values 
for the alphas are presented in parentheses. In addition, factor loadings, sample sizes, model F-test p-values 
and adjusted R2 are also reported for the 4-factor model. The null hypothesis for these tests is a coefficient 
of zero, except for the market factor where the null is one. The independent sell portfolio regression uses 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for the calculation of the coefficient significances. 
 Independent  Brokerage  
 Buy  Sell  Buy  Sell  
Excess return 0.014 
 
0.003 
 
0.009 
 
0.007 
 
Alphas 
        
CAPM 0.007 *** -0.003 
 
0.002 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.701) 
 
3-factor 0.007 *** -0.004 * 0.002 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.218) 
 
(0.807) 
 
4-factor 0.008 *** -0.004 * 0.002 
 
0.001 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.080) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.685) 
 
Factor loadings 
        
Rm–Rf 0.903 ** 0.897 * 0.962 
 
0.962 
 
SMB 0.407 *** 0.435 *** 0.186 ** 0.060 
 
HML 0.122 
 
0.224 ** 0.064 
 
0.065 
 
MOM -0.167 ** 0.009 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.090 * 
Model summary         
n 100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
p-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Adj.R2 0.8314 
 
0.8159 
 
0.9003 
 
0.9302 
 
Statistical significance levels indicated with: * <0.10, ** <0.05 and *** <0.01.   
 
Portfolio performance analysis shows that building a portfolio on independent analyst 
buy recommendations generates significant (0.01 level) positive abnormal returns after 
controlling for risk. The abnormal return documented is approximately 10 % annualized, 
which is consistent with the magnitude evidenced by Barber, Lehavy and Trueman 
(2007). Furthermore, the evidence shows a tilt towards small and past loser stocks. Sim-
ilarly, the sell portfolio generates abnormal returns, although only weakly significant 
(0.10 level). In contrast, the brokerage portfolios do not generate any abnormal returns, 
and the returns are primarily associated with the market return. This finding is in contrast 
to Barber et al. (2001) who find that all analysts on average are able to generate abnormal 
returns before controlling for transaction costs.  
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In sum, independent analysts are found to outperform brokerage analysts in long-term 
performance after controlling for risk. This finding is consistent with Carleton, Chen and 
Steiner (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), Cliff (2007) and Barber, Lehavy and True-
man (2007), who also document long-term outperformance by independent analysts. 
 
The portfolio performance analysis provides further evidence on the hypotheses of this 
study. Independent analysts are able to generate value to investors, whereas brokerage 
analysts do not generate abnormal returns, which is evidence in favor of the conflict of 
interest hypothesis over the superior information hypothesis. The clear outperformance 
of the independent portfolios over brokerage portfolios provides support to H2 (“Inde-
pendent analyst recommendations generate greater returns than brokerage analyst rec-
ommendations”). Furthermore, the positive and significant loadings on the SMB factor 
provide support to H3 (“Greater information asymmetry between investors and company 
management induces greater market reactions to recommendation revisions”). 
 
 
4.5 Robustness checks 
 
The effect of paid research 
The integrity of paid research has recently been questioned in the financial media as an-
alysts might have incentives to issue more optimistic opinions to attract more research 
clients (HS, 2019). On the other hand, opposing argument states that independence is 
actually at the core of the business model, because if no trust exists between investors and 
paid coverage analysts, the value of the research decreases. Consequently, the coverage 
would become useless for the underlying companies, which would eventually lead to los-
ing clients and breaking the business model. As most of the coverage by the independent 
firm in the sample is paid coverage, the next set of tests aim to investigate whether there 
is evidence of paid coverage resulting in biased research. 
 
Table 11 reports the results of the univariate analysis of differences in recommendation, 
target price premium and announcement period return averages between paid and unpaid 
analyst research. First, Panel A compares the averages for recommendations and target 
  
 
68 
price premiums. The differences in the averages indicate that paid independent recom-
mendations are relatively more optimistic without controlling for any other factors. This 
finding indicates that independent in overall are more pessimistic than brokerage analysts 
because of pessimistic recommendations issued for unpaying companies, which offsets 
the optimistic recommendations issued for research clients. This finding partly challenges 
H1, however, the higher optimism of paid research could also stem from the fact that 
companies with good future prospects are more willing to pay for research services than 
companies that know they are going to underperform. Moreover, the evidence from the 
analysis of target price premiums is mixed, since paid coverage leads to optimism in tar-
get prices for downgraded stocks and, on the other hand, pessimism in upgraded stocks. 
 
Table 11. Univariate analysis of paid and unpaid research differences 
This table reports univariate analysis of differences in recommendations, target prices and CMARs between 
paid and unpaid coverage for recommendation upgrades and downgrades. Results are reported for both the 
full sample and for a sub-sample consisting of only independent observations. Set up of the analysis is 
similar to Tables 5 and 6. 
Panel A: Recommendations and target price premiums 
 All research firms  Only independent  
Recommendation 
type 
Paid 
research 
Unpaid 
research 
Diff. 
p-value 
Paid 
research 
Unpaid 
research 
Diff. 
p-value 
Upgrades       
Rating 1.95 2.07 0.044 1.95 2.24 0.001 
n 278 1245  278 229  
Premium 8.9 % 13.3 % 0.000 8.9 % 8.4 % 0.684 
n 276 1243  276 229  
Downgrades       
Rating 3.52 3.40 0.092 3.52 3.85 0.000 
n 273 1221  273 233  
Premium 4.9 % 3.6 % 0.327 4.9 % 0.3 % 0.002 
n 270 1217  270 233  
Panel B: Announcement period returns 
Upgrades       
CMAR (0,+2) 1.68 % 1.34 % 0.278 1.68 % 1.07 % 0.104 
CMAR (-2,+2) 2.81 % 1.55 % 0.006 2.81 % 1.34 % 0.008 
Downgrades       
CMAR (0,+2) -2.09 % -1.10 % 0.001 -2.09 % -0.68 % 0.000 
CMAR (-2,+2) -2.64 % -1.48 % 0.008 -2.64 % -0.87 % 0.002 
Bolded values indicate significance at least at the 0.10 level.  
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Moving over to Panel B, the announcement period returns evidence that the market reac-
tion to paid coverage is significantly greater than for unpaid coverage. The finding shows 
that the market does not discount for paid coverage, indicating that the market does not 
consider there to exist any conflicts. This finding partly mitigates the previous finding 
that paid independent coverage is overly optimistic since the market does not consider 
there to exist conflicts of interest despite the higher optimism. This is consistent with the 
assumption that companies that know are going to perform well are more willing to pay 
for research services. To further validate this argument, the performances of paid and 
unpaid coverage companies are compared to test whether outperforming (underperform-
ing) companies are more likely to buy (refrain from buying) research services. The anal-
ysis is done by reconstructing the independent buy portfolio and separating paid and un-
paid coverage to their own portfolios. Table 12 below reports the regression results of the 
new portfolios. 
 
Table 12. Portfolio regression results for paid and unpaid coverage 
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the two new independent buy portfolios: paid 
coverage and unpaid coverage. The risk models are the same as in the regressions in Table 10. Abnormal 
return is measured as the alphas from these regressions. The null hypothesis for these tests is a coefficient 
of zero, except for the market factor where the null is one. 
 Paid independent  Unpaid independent  
 Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  
Excess return 0.017  0.009  
Alphas       
CAPM 0.011 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.541)  
3-factor 0.010 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.564)  
4-factor 0.012 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.172)  
Factor loadings       
Rm–Rf 0.797 (0.000) *** 1.009 (0.864)  
SMB 0.591 (0.001) *** 0.167 (0.229)  
HML 0.175 (0.193)  0.022 (0.843)  
MOM -0.148 (0.177)  -0.207 (0.021) ** 
Model summary     
n 100  100  
p-value 0.000***  0.000***  
Adj.R2 0.6644  0.8190  
Statistical significance levels indicated with: * <0.10, ** <0.05 and *** <0.01.   
 
  
 
70 
The results from Table 12 show that the paid coverage portfolio generates significant 
abnormal returns of approximately 15 % annualized, whereas the unpaid coverage port-
folio does not generate any abnormal returns. However, the outperformance of the paid 
portfolio is at least partly explained by a strong tilt towards small stocks as evidenced by 
the positive and significant (p-value 0.001) loading on the SMB factor. In sum, the rela-
tively higher optimism for paid coverage companies has not been misleading for inves-
tors, but instead led to higher abnormal returns, although at the expense of assuming more 
small firm risk. These findings further strengthen the evidence on H2 as well as on H3 
since greater information asymmetry is evidenced to induce higher returns. Furthermore, 
the evidence validates the argument that companies that know they are going to outper-
form are more willing to pay for research services, which subsequently causes the higher 
optimism for paid coverage companies, and not possible conflicts arising from paid re-
search. Hence, these tests validate the acceptance of H1 since paid research is not evi-
denced to cause conflicts. 
 
The impact of transaction costs 
As Barber et al. (2001) show, accounting for transaction costs will have a deteriorating 
effect on portfolio returns which can diminish the potential abnormal returns. In the sec-
ond robustness test, the portfolios will be reconstructed to account for transaction costs. 
From a retail investor’s perspective, average transaction cost per trade is estimated at 1 
% of the trade value14. The cost is approximately in line with Barber et al. (2001), who 
estimate transaction costs at 1.31 % for their US based data. Because it was already shown 
that sell portfolios do not generate abnormal returns even before transaction costs, the 
impact of transaction costs is estimated only for the buy portfolios. Table 13 reports the 
results for the estimation of the abnormal returns in the time-series regressions after con-
trolling for transaction costs. 
 
Performance of both portfolios has naturally declined from the analysis of gross returns. 
Brokerage portfolio only barely outperforms the market index with a total return of 125 
% compared to 122 % by the market, whereas the independent portfolio generates a total 
return of 251 %. Results from the regressions are identical in nature compared to the 
                                                 
14 Approximation is a conservative estimate based on the transaction rates of five major stock brokerages 
in Finland at the time of writing. 
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analysis of gross returns. Even though the magnitude of abnormal returns has declined, 
the independent buy portfolio still generates abnormal returns of approximately 8 % an-
nualized, whereas the brokerage portfolio does not generate any abnormal returns. In con-
clusion, the evidence on H2 is robust to controlling for transaction costs. 
 
Table 13. Portfolio performance regression results after transaction costs 
This table reports the results for the time-series regressions of the two buy portfolios after 1 % transaction 
costs. The setup and risk models are the same as in the regressions in Table 10, apart from the missing sell 
portfolios. Abnormal return is measured as the alphas from these regressions. The null hypothesis for these 
tests is a coefficient of zero, except for the market factor where the null is one. 
 Independent  Brokerage  
 Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  
Excess return 0.012  0.007  
Alphas       
CAPM 0.005 (0.013) ** 0.000 (0.758)  
3-factor 0.005 (0.017) ** 0.000 (0.895)  
4-factor 0.006 (0.003) *** 0.000 (0.781)  
Factor loadings       
Rm–Rf 0.903 (0.034) ** 0.962 (0.269)  
SMB 0.400 (0.001) *** 0.195 (0.035) ** 
HML 0.128 (0.177)  0.073 (0.311)  
MOM -0.161 (0.039) ** -0.026 (0.659)  
Model summary     
n 100  100  
p-value 0.000***  0.000***  
Adj.R2 0.8310  0.9001  
Statistical significance levels indicated with: * <0.10, ** <0.05 and *** <0.01.   
 
The impact of less frequent portfolio balancing 
All previous tests in this research assume that the portfolios are rebalanced daily, which 
requires effort and time from the investor, as well as induces more trading and subse-
quently more transaction costs. A more realistic scenario for the common investor is that 
the portfolio is balanced less frequently, and therefore the next test examines whether 
balancing the buy portfolios on weekly or monthly basis affects the abnormal returns 
generated by following analyst recommendations. Again, only buy portfolios are included 
in this test due to the sell portfolios not being able to generate significant abnormal returns 
even with daily balancing. Table 14 below reports the results of the portfolio regressions 
when the portfolios are balanced on a weekly and monthly basis. The results show that 
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less frequent balancing reduces the abnormal returns, and the reduction is greater for the 
independent portfolio, whereas the brokerage portfolio average excess return is not ma-
terially affected. However, consistent with previous analyses, independent still outper-
form by generating significant abnormal returns, whereas brokerage portfolios do not 
generate significant abnormal returns. In sum, evidence on H2 is robust to less frequent 
portfolio rebalancing. 
 
Table 14. Portfolio abnormal returns with weekly and monthly rebalancing 
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the buy portfolios when the portfolios are 
rebalanced weekly and monthly. The setup and risk models are the same as in the regressions in Table 10, 
apart from the missing sell portfolios. Abnormal return is measured as the alphas from these regressions. 
The null hypothesis for these tests is a coefficient of zero, except for the market factor where the null is 
one. 
 Independent  Brokerage  
 Weekly  Monthly  Weekly  Monthly  
Excess return 0.014 
 
0.011 
 
0.009 
 
0.009 
 
Alphas 
        
CAPM 0.007 *** 0.005 ** 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.203) 
 
(0.274) 
 
3-factor 0.007 *** 0.004 ** 0.002 
 
0.001 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.266) 
 
(0.331) 
 
4-factor 0.008 *** 0.006 *** 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.278) 
 
Factor loadings 
        
Rm–Rf 0.903 ** 0.880 *** 0.964 
 
0.963 
 
SMB 0.407 *** 0.362 *** 0.176 * 0.176 * 
HML 0.122 
 
0.138 
 
0.063 
 
0.081 
 
MOM -0.167 ** -0.151 ** -0.033 
 
-0.030 
 
Model summary         
n 100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
p-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Adj.R2 0.8314 
 
0.8410 
 
0.8985 
 
0.9040 
 
Statistical significance levels indicated with: * <0.10, ** <0.05 and *** <0.01.   
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research investigates the value of equity research from a retail investor’s perspective 
by analyzing the information content and value of analysts’ stock recommendations. The 
purpose of this research is to examine whether the value of equity research differs be-
tween purely independent and traditional brokerage analysts. Analysis is made by exam-
ining the average recommendation and target price levels, announcement period returns 
to recommendation revisions, and long-term portfolio returns. Tests are conducted with 
a dataset of Finnish sell-side equity analyst recommendations by 24 different analyst 
firms from February 2010 through May 2018. 
 
In conclusion, the findings of this study evidence the following. First, brokerage analysts 
are shown to issue more optimistic recommendations and target prices. In the full sample, 
the average recommendation by independent analysts is 2.87 compared to 2.65 by bro-
kerage analysts, and the difference is found to be statistically significant. Moreover, the 
difference in recommendation levels is most pronounced for recommendation down-
grades sub-sample, where the average recommendation by independent analysts is 3.67 
compared to 3.30 by brokerage analysts. This finding suggests that brokerage analysts 
are more reluctant to issue greater downgrades. Findings from target price premiums are 
similar in nature. In the full sample, brokerage analysts issued significantly higher target 
prices (premium of 10.2 % compared to 5.9 % by independent analysts). The difference 
is economically and statistically most significant for recommendation upgrades sub-sam-
ple (14.4 % compared to 8.7 % by independents). Collectively, these findings evidence 
greater optimism by brokerage analysts, which leads to accepting H1 of this study. 
 
Second, no differences are found between the announcement period market reactions to 
recommendation revisions by different analyst types. Announcement period returns for 
independent recommendations appear to be relatively greater, however, the differences 
in the returns are not statistically significant, except for the 11-day window around rec-
ommendation upgrades, where the average CMAR of 2.43 % for independent recommen-
dations is significantly different from brokerage CMAR of 1.50 %. Due to the differences 
being primarily insignificant, the findings suggest that the market values the initial infor-
mation content of analyst recommendations equally and does not discount potentially 
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conflicted analysts’ views nor believes that they have superior information. The short-
term returns analysis does not provide support to H2. 
 
Third, in long-term portfolio performance independent recommendations are found to 
significantly outperform recommendations by brokerage analysts. The gross abnormal 
return from following independent buy recommendations with a buy-and-hold investment 
strategy is approximately 10 % annualized. In contrast to Barber et al. (2001), the abnor-
mal performance is robust to controlling for transaction costs, which only decrease the 
abnormal return to approximately 8 % annualized. In addition, the abnormal returns are 
robust to balancing the portfolios less frequently than on a daily basis. Furthermore, in-
dependent sell portfolio underperforms that of brokerage, evidencing that independent 
analysts are also better at identifying underperforming stocks. However, neither sell port-
folio is able to generate abnormal nor absolute negative returns, evidencing that short 
selling pessimistic analyst recommendations is not profitable. In sum, the statistical sig-
nificance and magnitude of the difference between the buy portfolios leads to partly ac-
cepting H2. 
 
Fourth, informational asymmetries as proxied by small firm size and low analyst coverage 
show that greater information asymmetry induces greater market reactions. More specif-
ically, low analyst coverage is found to induce greater market reactions to recommenda-
tion upgrades, and small firm size to recommendation downgrades. The 5-day CMAR (-
2,+2) to recommendation upgrades for firms with only one analyst covering them is 170 
basis points greater than for firms with multiple analysts. Furthermore, the 5-day CMAR 
to recommendation downgrades for small-cap (medium-cap) firms is found to be -250 (-
180) basis points more negative than for large-cap firms. Collectively, these findings ev-
idence that greater information asymmetry induces greater market reactions, which leads 
to accepting H3. 
 
Fifth, the returns prior to recommendation upgrades or downgrades suggest that the mar-
ket could learn of on-going research processes and to predict their outcome, however, no 
reliable differences are identified between independent and brokerage firms. The negative 
drift before recommendation upgrades turns positive 5 days (4 days) prior to the revision 
for independent (brokerage) analysts. Moreover, for downgrades the positive drift turns 
negative one day prior to the recommendation revision for both analyst types. In sum, the 
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evidence suggests that market learning is plausible for both analyst types and more pro-
nounced before recommendation upgrades. Furthermore, the anticipation by the market 
appears to be greater for independent recommendations, although no significant con-
sistent differences between the analyst types are identified. However, the tests do not 
control for other events taking place before the revisions and therefore the results could 
also be evidence of self-selection bias, meaning that analysts might tend to upgrade 
(downgrade) recommendations soon after some good (bad) news are reported about the 
company, in which case these good (bad) news itself would have caused the drift to shift. 
In addition, the findings assume that the recommendations in the database are recorded 
on the correct dates, which cannot be confirmed. Collectively, these findings do not pro-
vide support to H4, which leads to rejecting the hypothesis. To conclude, Table 15 sum-
marizes the hypotheses of this study.  
 
Table 15. Summary of the hypotheses 
Hypothesis Status Comments 
H1: Brokerage analysts issue 
more optimistic recommendations 
and target prices than independ-
ent analysts 
Accepted 
The difference is statistically sig-
nificant for both, but economi-
cally more significant for target 
prices 
H2: Independent analyst recom-
mendations generate greater re-
turns than brokerage analyst rec-
ommendations 
Partly accepted 
No differences are documented in 
announcement period returns, 
however, in long-term returns in-
dependent clearly outperform 
H3: Greater information asym-
metry between investors and 
company management induces 
greater market reactions to rec-
ommendation revisions 
Accepted 
Greater information asymmetries 
as proxied by small firm size and 
low analyst coverage are docu-
mented to induce greater market 
reactions  
H4: The market learns to predict 
on-going brokerage research pro-
cesses to a greater extent than in-
dependent research processes 
Rejected 
Market actually appears to antici-
pate independent recommenda-
tions to a greater extent, but no 
significant consistent differences 
are identified between the analyst 
types 
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There are two key contributions from this study. First, purely independent equity research 
is still a scarcely investigated field due to the small amount of purely independent firms. 
In addition, recent regulatory changes, for example MiFID 2, pressure traditional broker-
age firm research to assume a more independent status as ties to other departments of the 
banks are being cut off and monitored more closely. The field calls for more research, 
and by examining a recent time period this study extends the existing literature and doc-
uments clear outperformance by independent analysts over brokerage analysts in long-
term abnormal returns, which is robust to controlling transaction costs and less frequent 
portfolio rebalancing. This result indicates that the efforts of the regulators have had merit 
as independent research firms are capable of providing valuable research to investors de-
spite having to come up with new business models to sustain the research business on its 
own.  
 
Second, the independence of purely independent research firms has recently been ques-
tioned if the research firm is paid for its coverage by the target companies (HS, 2019). 
The results of this study indicate that the performance of paid coverage is not inferior, but 
instead superior to traditional research firms with unpaid coverage, as evidenced by the 
outperformance of the independent recommendations in this study. This indicates that the 
analysts have greater incentives to maintain the good quality of the research in order to 
attract more investor audience, and subsequently more research clients, in order to sustain 
the business model. The finding gives merit to the independent research firms charging 
for their coverage as well as to the brokerage firms which have chosen to shift towards 
charging for their research in order to increase the independence of their research units. 
 
 
5.1 Reliability and limitations 
 
For the interpretation of the results of this research, some important limitations must be 
considered. First, the chosen time period of this study takes place at the time of a long 
bull market as, apart from year 2011, the market index has increased each year with an 
average annual return of 10 %. Therefore, the findings of this study are largely confined 
to a market growth period and do not necessarily describe the situation in a bear market.  
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Second, even though the sample consisting of 24 individual research firms and 3438 rec-
ommendations is large enough for statistical testing, it does not fully represent the rec-
ommendations made in Finland during the time period due to some database restrictions. 
Out of the total recommendations in the database, approximately 60 % could be included 
in the sample. This notion further limits the generalizability of the results. Furthermore, 
the sample is predisposed to survivorship bias as recommendations are included in the 
sample only for those companies that the research firms are still covering. If a research 
firm dropped the coverage of a company during the time period, the recommendations 
issued before the termination are not accessible from the database. Moreover, some re-
search firms choose to record their recommendations in the database anonymously and 
therefore these recommendations cannot be included in the sample. 
 
Third, only one research firm in the sample qualifies as a purely independent research 
firm as other firms also engage in brokerage services (investment banking or stock bro-
kering). Due to this reason the results of this study might be affected by certain company 
specific characteristics that are not accounted for. However, this is not because some pure 
research firms are absent from the data, but because no other pure independent research 
firms currently exist in the Finnish stock market. 
 
 
5.2 Suggestions for future research 
 
Couple interesting topics for future research emerge from this study. First, the role and 
value of equity research in today’s supercomputer era is often questioned as vast infor-
mation contents are available and accessible by almost everyone. Furthermore, regulatory 
pressures are causing traditional brokerage firms to cut down on their research staff, since 
the costs of the research can no more be included in the prices of other services (Financial 
Times, 2018). Research firms are under heavy pressure to shift towards new ways of 
doing business, whilst maintaining the integrity of their research. A new emerging busi-
ness model in the industry is to charge the target companies for their coverage. At the 
same time, the research quality is questioned if the analyst firm receives their compensa-
tion from the target company (HS, 2019). Even though this study sheds light into the 
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value of paid coverage, future studies need to address this issue in more detail to better 
understand what this shift means for the value of equity research.  
 
Second, for the reason that this study does not control for firm specific factors of the 
independent company in the sample, future research could investigate further into what 
other factors affect the performance of equity research firms. For example, the vast digi-
talization efforts carried out by the independent company in the sample have strongly 
increased its presence in the market, specifically among retail investors. Whether this has 
increased the informativeness of the research or just increased the overall hype around 
the firm is yet to be answered. The effects of digital disruption and regulatory pressure 
are creating waves for the industry to shift towards new business and operating models 
and investors and academics alike ought to understand better what this means. In other 
words, what digitalization means for the equity research industry, and what are the effects 
of making equity research more easily accessible and more engaging to the common in-
vestors are important areas to investigate further. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of covered firms 
 
Company (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ADMICOM Small 1 2 2.00  EVLI PANKKI Medium 1 3 1.33 
AHLSTRÖM-
MUNKSJÖ 
Large 3 18 2.44  
EXEL  
COMPOSITES 
Small 2 18 2.44 
AKTIA Medium 1 22 2.27  F-SECURE Medium 2 32 2.47 
ALMA MEDIA Medium 2 31 2.94  FINNAIR Large 3 42 2.69 
ALTIA Medium 1 1 3.00  FISKARS Large 2 11 3.00 
AMER SPORTS Large 4 40 1.90  FONDIA Small 1 3 3.67 
APETIT Small 1 19 3.37  FORTUM Large 13 115 2.85 
ASIAKASTIETO 
GROUP 
Medium 1 6 2.17  GLASTON Small 2 19 2.74 
ASPO Medium 3 24 2.46  GOFORE Small 2 3 2.67 
ASPOCOMP 
GROUP 
Small 1 8 3.00  HEEROS Small 1 3 3.67 
ATRIA Medium 1 32 2.44  HKSCAN Medium 1 30 3.43 
AVIDLY Small 1 8 1.75  HUHTAMÄKI Large 3 43 2.51 
BASWARE Medium 2 39 2.49  INNOFACTOR Small 2 17 2.71 
BITTIUM Medium 2 34 2.94  
INVESTORS 
HOUSE 
Small 1 5 2.80 
CAPMAN Medium 3 29 2.48  KAMUX Medium 3 4 1.75 
CARGOTEC Large 5 73 2.59  KEMIRA Large 4 59 2.61 
CAVERION Medium 3 31 2.61  KESKO Large 4 53 2.83 
CITYCON Large 6 40 2.50  KESLA Small 1 9 2.44 
CONSTI GROUP Small 2 13 1.85  KONE Large 8 59 3.10 
CRAMO Medium 3 40 2.40  KONECRANES Large 6 52 2.58 
DETECTION  
TECHNOLOGY 
Small 2 8 2.63  KOTIPIZZA GROUP Small 4 25 2.84 
DIGIA Small 2 30 1.83  
LASSILA &  
TIKANOJA 
Medium 2 26 2.50 
DNA Large 2 8 3.13  LEHTO GROUP Medium 2 10 2.50 
DOVRE GROUP Small 1 1 5.00  MARIMEKKO Small 3 29 3.45 
EAB GROUP Small 1 3 2.67  MARTELA Small 1 22 2.14 
EFECTE Small 1 1 1.00  METSO Large 6 64 2.55 
EFORE Small 1 9 3.67  METSÄ BOARD Large 4 65 2.43 
ELISA Large 5 65 2.94  NEO INDUSTRIAL Small 1 8 3.50 
ENDOMINES Small 1 5 3.20  NESTE Large 7 104 2.74 
EQ Medium 2 14 2.71  NEXT GAMES Small 2 5 2.20 
ETTEPLAN Medium 2 33 2.12  NIXU Small 1 6 2.50 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NOKIA Large 13 151 2.75  SILMÄASEMA Small 1 3 1.33 
NOKIAN RENKAAT Large 6 66 2.73  SOLTEQ Small 1 14 2.93 
NORDEA BANK Large 6 43 2.77  SRV Medium 3 45 2.84 
NURMINEN  
LOGISTICS 
Small 1 2 4.50  SSAB Large 6 50 3.12 
OLVI Medium 2 35 2.86  STOCKMANN Medium 3 55 3.51 
ORAVA Small 1 19 3.11  STORA ENSO Large 6 77 2.44 
ORIOLA  
CORPORATION 
Medium 3 45 2.71  
SUOMEN  
HOIVATILAT 
Medium 2 12 2.08 
ORION Large 5 48 3.52  SUOMINEN Medium 2 23 2.96 
OUTOKUMPU Large 6 92 2.75  TAALERI Medium 2 11 2.27 
OUTOTEC Medium 4 69 2.87  TALENOM Small 2 9 1.78 
PANOSTAJA Small 1 11 2.91  TECHNOPOLIS Medium 2 27 1.81 
PIHLAJALINNA Medium 4 14 1.64  TECNOTREE Small 1 15 3.73 
PIIPPO Small 1 8 3.38  TELESTE Small 2 34 2.53 
PONSSE Medium 2 29 2.90  TELIA Large 8 60 2.73 
PRIVANET GROUP Small 1 7 3.14  TERVEYSTALO Large 2 2 2.00 
PÖYRY Medium 2 25 3.56  TIETO Large 5 50 2.98 
QT GROUP Small 1 2 1.50  TIKKURILA Medium 4 51 2.92 
RAISIO Medium 2 24 2.21  TITANIUM Small 1 5 2.60 
RAMIRENT Medium 3 54 2.81  TOKMANNI Small 2 4 1.75 
RAPALA VMC Small 2 26 2.58  
TOKMANNI 
GROUP 
Medium 1 1 1.00 
RAUTE Small 1 20 3.20  
UNITED  
BANKERS 
Small 1 4 3.00 
REMEDY Small 1 1 1.00  UPM Large 5 70 2.94 
RESTAMAX Small 1 10 1.80  UPONOR Large 2 28 2.14 
REVENIO GROUP Medium 1 13 2.62  
UUTECHNIC 
GROUP 
Small 1 6 3.50 
ROBIT Small 1 3 2.33  VALMET Large 5 39 2.74 
ROVIO Medium 2 3 2.00  
VERKKO-
KAUPPA 
Small 2 15 2.27 
SAMPO Large 5 50 2.50  VINCIT Small 1 4 4.00 
SANOMA Large 3 60 2.83  VÄISÄLÄ Medium 2 28 3.14 
SCANFIL Medium 2 8 2.25  WÄRTSILÄ Large 6 63 2.92 
SIILI SOLUTIONS Small 1 8 2.25  YIT Large 4 56 2.59 
(1) = Company size           
(2) = Number of analysts covering the company        
(3) = Number of recommendations         
(4) = Average recommendation          
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Appendix 2: Sample normal distribution test results 
 
Panel A: Announcement period returns 
 CMAR  
(0,+2) 
CMAR  
(-2,+2) 
CMAR  
(-5,+5) 
CMAR  
(-10,+10) 
Observations 3418 3406 3402 3393 
Mean 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Median 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Standard deviation 0.041 0.064 0.078 0.097 
Skewness 0.473 0.068 0.188 0.353 
Excess Kurtosis 5.088 6.316 3.590 1.497 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Panel B: Portfolio returns 
 Independent  
(Buy) 
Independent 
(Sell) 
Brokerage 
(Buy) 
Brokerage 
(Sell) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 
Mean 0.014 0.003 0.009 0.007 
Median 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.010 
Standard deviation 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045 
Skewness 0.162 0.276 0.571 0.222 
Excess Kurtosis 0.750 0.990 0.719 0.026 
p-value 0.109 0.046* 0.060 0.602 
Normal distribution tests conducted with Jargue-Bera test. Null hypothesis states that sample distribution 
matches a normal distribution. Statistical significance levels indicated with: * <0.05 and ** <0.01. 
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Appendix 4: Correlation matrix for time-series regressions 
 
  Rm–Rf SMB HML MOM 
Rm–Rf Correlation  -0.158 0.312** -0.184 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.117 0.002 0.067 
SMB Correlation -0.112  -0.076 0.030 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.266  0.451 0.769 
HML Correlation 0.295** -0.020  -0.468** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.841  0.000 
MOM Correlation -0.129 0.033 -0.467**  
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.203 0.745 0.000   
Statistical significance levels indicated with: * <0.05 and ** <0.01. 
n =100. Pearson (Spearman) correlations presented above (below) the diagonal. 
 
